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to my parents 
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"Theory," said Leonardo da Vinci, "is the general; 
experiments are the soldiers." Economic science 
has already well-trained generals, but because of 
the nature of the material in which it works, the 
soldiers are hard to obtain. 
-- A.C. Pigou 
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ABSTRACT 
The literature on the use of economic incentives to deal with 
environmental problems makes a persuasive case that policy tools such 
as emissions taxes or tradable emission permits have important 
potential advantages compared to source-specific technical standards. 
Despite the apparent advantages of incentive-based methods, some 
questions have been raised about the feasibility of their 
implementation. This thesis is part of a larger research project that 
addresses these feasibility questions. The principal task undertaken 
here is to gather the information needed to evaluate the applicability 
of a marketable permit scheme for dealing with a particular pollution 
problem (sulfur oxides emissions) in a particular place (the 
Los Angeles Basin). 
The analysis begins with a description of the concept of 
marketable permits and how it differs from existing regulatory 
approaches. An agenda for research on transferable permits is 
outlined. Some of the potential problems in making the transition from 
the current approach to a market approach are then discussed. 
The next part of the analysis focuses on some of the key 
empirical issues. The effects of changing the natural gas supply are 
quantified. Static efficiency gains in moving from the status quo to a 
market approach are also estimated. This is followed by an analysis of 
the gains from having several markets corresponding to different 
viii 
receptor points. A key result is that the payoff to having several 
markets, when measured in terms of abatement cost savings, is quite 
small for this particular example. 
The final part of the analysis is devoted to a discussion of 
theoretical issues that might arise in designing a market. First, the 
comparative statics results relating to the control of sulfur oxides 
emissions are derived. Next, a more general model is used to address 
the issue of how a firm might influence the equilibrium achieved in the 
permits market. Finally, some issues in identifying cost-effective 
solutions to problems with multiple objectives are addressed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The mathematical analysis of economic problems can be usefully 
divided into three steps. The first part of the analysis usually 
develops an abstract theoretical model of agents interacting in one or 
several markets. Frequently, the model is based on the assumption that 
firms and individuals exhibit maximizing behavior. For example, 
producers may maximize prof its while consumers typically maximize their 
happiness or utility. Once the model is formulated, the next step is 
to focus on the assumptions that are necessary to imply a certain set 
of outcomes. In the case of transferable licenses, we will see that 
producer cost functions must exhibit a special shape to ensure that a 
market in tradable licenses yields a specified level of air qual_ity at 
least cost. The third step in the analysis is probably the most 
critical for determining the usefulness of a model for making policy 
prescriptions. It requires a careful analysis of the empirical 
validity of the assumptions underlying the model along with an informed 
assessment of the relevance of the model, taking into account the 
differences between the formal analysis and the "real world." Indeed, 
while this inductive approach of moving from the simple to the complex 
is one of the cornerstones of scientific analysis, its applicability to 
social problems has been less than an unabashed success. In defense of 
this approach, Dales offers the following rationale: 
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Economists have found that it is usually very helpful to 
attack complex problems like pollution by assuming away 
all their complexities and then solving the artificially 
simplified problems that remain. The value of the technique 
lies not in the answer to the artificial problem (ask an 
artificial question and you'll get an artificial answer) but 
in the making of the assumptions that allow us to solve it, 
for these assumptions help us to identify what features of 
the original problem make it complex and difficult. And it 
is only when we know exactly what the difficulties are that 
we can begin to zero in on them. Let us, then, begin our 
study of the economics of pollution with a very simple 
problem, taking great care to note exactly why it is so simple. 1 
As a model of analysis, the approach has much to recommend for 
it. However, it can be easily misused if one is not careful. Economic 
models of pollution problems have tended to be overly simplistic in 
their assumptions regarding firm behavior and have, in general, devoted 
little study to the actual implementation of various methods for 
improving environmental quality. This study is an attempt to bridge 
the gap between existing theoretical literature on markets for tradable 
emission licenses and the question of when such markets can provide a 
cost-effective means of limiting pollution. The analysis consists of 
four parts shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 
Principal Components of Thesis 
1. Introduction to Marketable Permits and 
Research Design 
2. Empirical Findings 
3. Theoretical Issues 






The first part of the thesis provides a definition of the 
problem. The theory of markets in transferable emission rights is 
reviewed in Chapter 2. The objective is to review the nature of the 
· work which has been completed, and outline areas of research which will 
be useful in assessing both the feasibility and relative merits of a 
marketable permit scheme. 
Empirical issues are addressed in the second part of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 examines some of the key concerns in implementing a market 
designed to limit pollution. The issues are brought into focus by 
considering a particular example~the control of sulfur oxides 
emissions in Los Angeles. In Chapter 4, the market is characterized by 
combining abatement cost data and an air quality model. Quantitative 
estimates of a permit price are obtained and the sensitivity of price 
to the supply of natural g~s and the choice of an air quality target 
are examined. 
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The discussion of the empirical findings is followed by a 
rigorous treatment of some of the principal theoretical concerns which 
arise in designing incentive-based systems for controlling pollution. 
Chapter 5 analyzes how a firm with inputs of variable quality will 
react in a market for transferable emissions permits. This is followed 
in Chapter 6 by a discussion of the relationship between market power 
and transferable property rights. A theoretical model is developed in 
which the initial distribution of permits has a systematic effect on 
the market equilibrium. Chapter 7 considers some of the problems which 
may arise in extending the analysis to the case of controlling several 
pollutants simultaneously. 
The empirical and theoretical results are reviewed in the final 
two chapters. Areas for future research are outlined in Chapter 8, and 
the principal results of the analysis are summarized in Chapter 9. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 1 
1~ Dales (1968), p. 27. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IMPLEMENTING A MARKETABLE PERMIT SCHEME: THE ROAD AHEAD 
One of the most frequently heard criticisms of the current 
standards-based approach to environmental regulation is that it fails 
to meet prescribed environmental objectives in a cost-effective manner. 
If this is in fact true, it would seem incumbent upon those bent on 
improving the environment to provide alternatives which would be less 
expensive than the current approach, but also have the possibility of 
being adopted. This paper examines one candidate which has been 
suggested as a viable alternative to the existing mode of environmental 
regulation. The general idea is to set up a market where rights to 
emit one or several pollutants can be bought and sold. This approach 
has been referred to by several names including tradable permits, 
transferable licenses and marketable permits. The principal objective 
of this essay is to outline the nature of the work which has been 
completed on tradable permits and, in so doing, point out areas of 
research which might be of some benefit in assessing both the 
feasibility and relative merits of a marketable permit scheme. 
Before discussing the details involved in the tradable permit 
approach, it is useful to consider what objectives we should place 
importance on in designing an environmental policy. At a minimum, it 
would seem reasonable to design a program which would meet the 
prescribed environmental quality objectives, or at least allow for 
meeting objectives in a timely manner. A second desirable feature of an 
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environmental strategy is that it use a minimum amount of resources in 
achieving its goals, where resources are defined broadly to include 
both administrative costs and direct expenditures on abatement. If 
possible, such a policy should not stand in the way of economic 
progress. Finally, to be more than an intellectual curiosity, the 
approach should have some possibility of appealing to politicians or 
regulators who are responsible for developing environmental policy. 
The traditional standards approach to regulation is clearly a 
political favorite, but does not seem to fare well in terms of 
efficiency. In the case of uniform standards, it is usually possible 
to achieve significant cost savings by redistributing the burden of 
cleaning up so that firms for whom it is cheaper will abate more than 
firms who have very high abatement costs. Even in the case where 
standards are designed to approximate a least-cost solution, it is 
quite likely that the regulator will lack the information to identify 
the solution. In particular, one would expect that several industries 
possess information on process modifications useful for abatement which 
are proprietary, and hence, typically not available to the regulator. 
It would be desirable to develop a mechanism for inducing industry to 
actively pursue these abatement options when they are cost-effective. 
Another more serious flaw of the standards approach is that firms 
have no reason to abate more than the standard. In the most idyllic of 
worlds, where standards are treated as a given, firms may have an 
incentive to search for lower cost alternatives for meeting the 
standard; however, this will not always be the case since some 
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standards are technology-based. If instead of a standards approach, 
some pricing mechanism were used to reduce pollution, then, at least in 
theory, firms would have a continuous incentive to innovate not only 
to find lower cost methods of achieving a given standard, but also to 
search for ways to reduce emissions. 
Three general approaches for providing continuous incentives for 
searching for new pollution abatement methods are taxes, subsidies and 
marketable permits. The virtues of emissions taxes are well known. If 
firms are cost minimizers, Baumol and Oates (1975) have shown that 
imposing such taxes can lead to a cost-minimizing solution. However, 
taxes are not without their problems. One difficulty is that it is 
virtually impossible to predict the level of emissions which would 
result upon imposing a tax. To partially circumvent this problem, some 
people have suggested that taxes could be adjusted until the desired 
outcome is attained. There are three basic problems with this 
suggestion: First, it may be quite expensive for firms to adjust to 
wide fluctuations in taxes; second, it is unlikely that the regulatory 
authority would be given that much discretion in adjusting the tax; and 
third, firms are likely to respond strategically if their response 
affects how taxes would be adjusted. 
A more serious problem with emissions taxes would seem to be 
their widespread unpopularity among industry. While they confer 
benefits on the general public, they force firms to foot both the 
abatement costs and the tax bill. The extent to which firms pay taxes 
out of prof its depends on whether the increase in taxes can be passed 
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along to consumers. Nevertheless, for the case in which total 
emissions are similar, it is usually in industry's interest to oppose 
taxes in comparison with standards because the latter avoid the tax. 
Providing subsidies for reducing emissions is yet another way to 
deal with pollution. Subsidies have the advantage that they have met 
with considerably less political resistance than taxes. In fact, this 
instrument has been widely used in the construction of municipal sewage 
treatment plants. Aside from the advantage of political feasiblity, 
however, subsidies have few good points. Their most serious drawback 
is that they usually fail to provide an incentive to keep expenditures 
on abatement down. Like taxes, subsidies also have the problem tthat 
the level of resulting emissions is very uncertain. 
Marketable permits suffer few of the drawbacks of the other tools 
discussed thus far while enjoying many if not all of the advantages. 
The idea was popularized by Dales (1968) who argues that a market 
approach has the potential to meet environmental quality objectives at 
the lowest possible cost while allowing for economic growth. Dales 
envisioned a hypothetical pollution control board specifying the total 
number of permits, and hence, the overall level of emissions allowed in 
a given region. Rights of different duration could be bought and sold 
through the board by anyone who wished to participate. To accommodate 
growth some permits might be withheld initially. A critical question 
is whether the idea of marketable permits could ever win favor in the 
political arena. One potential advantage that permits have over taxes 
is that they can avoid net payments to the government if they are 
10 
initially given away rather than auctioned. If permits were given away 
to industry, then at least some firms might favor marketable permits 
over the conventional standards approach because of the wealth transfer 
they would receive in the form of valuable permits. 
Dales offers a very general discussion of how a market in 
tradable permits would work. A more rigorous analysis of the issue is 
contained in Montgomery (1972), who shows conditions under which 
tradable permits will be an efficient mechanism for attaining a least-
cost solution. Montgomery raises an important problem in defining a 
permit by drawing a distinction between emissions and ambient pollutant 
concentrations. Defining permits in terms of emissions may not be the 
cost-minimizing strategy for achieving a given air quality target. The 
reason is that the same amount of emissions may have a different effect 
on ambient air quality if emitted at different locations. If so, 
charging firms the same price for a "unit" of emissions will typically 
imply that the marginal cost of improving the level of air quality will 
differ across firms. This result holds because firms are being charged 
a uniform price for emissions and not for pollution. 
In theory, permits could be defined in terms of ambient air 
quality at different receptors, but to ensure an efficient solution, 
this would require the creation of several permit markets in a given 
air quality region. The extent to which such fine tuning is justified 
on a purely economic basis is an open question. Initial research 
indicates that savings could be quite large. However, in my opinion, 
the likelihood of instituting several markets to deal with a single 
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pollutant in a given airshed is next to nil. Rather than search for 
the optimum, it would perhaps be more fruitful to consider the effects 
of a single market with some trading restrictions, or the effects of 
defining two or three markets within a geographical region. 
Applied research on marketable permits has followed two lines of 
inquiry. The first focuses on problems encountered in market design 
and the definition of a permit. One difficult problem is what to do in 
the event the equilibrium price of a permit is much higher than 
anticipated. Firms could conceivably balk at paying such high prices, 
or even be put on the verge of bankruptcy, in which case the marketable 
permit scheme might be terminated. To deal with such a contingency, 
Roberts and Spence (1976) suggest the use of a mixed system of permits 
and fees, where the quantity of pollution would be fixed, unless the 
equilibrium perm.it price exceeds a certain level. In the latter case, 
firms would be charged a fee for emissions not accounted for by 
existing perm.its. The fee would provide firms with a continuous 
incentive to reduce emissions until the overall emissions objective was 
met. The use of such a mixed system makes sense in theory, but in 
practice it might be difficult to implement because it explicitly 
raises the issue of taxing, and it may be too complex for the political 
process to digest. A more workable alternative would be to adjust the 
level of permits over time by issuing at least some perm.its of limited 
duration, and giving the regulatory authority some discretion over the 
number of permits issued over time. 
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Another problem which has received little attention in the 
literature is whether it makes sense to have firms with vastly 
different degrees of market power participate in the same market. Mar 
(1971), in designing a system of water rights, suggests using two 
separate markets -- one for large institutions and one for individuals 
or small institutions. The rationale for this approach is unclear. 
There are several commodity and stock markets currently in existence 
which manage to accommodate both large and small investors. If a few 
firms are expected to dominate a market in tradable permits, then there 
are two options. One is to abandon the marketable permit approach. 
The second is to design institutional safeguards which guard against 
contingencies such as thin markets and cornering. While several 
authors have recognized the possibility of a market which is not 
competitive, little effort has been devoted to addressing the issue in 
a concrete policy application. 
The second general approach to analyzing the market for tradable 
permits is simulation of the equilibrium permit price using 
mathematical programming techniques. DeLucia (1974) analyzes the case 
of eight Mohawk river municipalities and concludes that a marketable 
permit approach is a viable alternative for achieving significant cost 
savings in water pollution. Even in the case where one of the firms 
can exert control over market price, DeLucia finds that the effect on 
the price and distribution of permits is minimal. This result is due 
to the shape of the treatment cost functions. DeLucia's general 
systems approach of considering the technical, legal and economic 
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dimensions of the problem represents a quantum leap over previous 
efforts to demonstrate the viability of a permit scheme. Nevertheless, 
the analysis is less than convincing on one crucial point -- why it is 
reasonable to assume that municipalities will run their waste treatment 
facilities in a cost-minimizing mode. 
Other studies of permit markets in the early seventies are 
similar in approach, but narrower in scope. For example, Taylor (1975) 
uses a linear prograIIUlling model to appraise a regional market in 
fertilizer rights aimed at reducing water pollution. Mackintosh (1973) 
considers a hypothetical air rights market in New Orleans and develops 
a simulation model to illustrate the effect it has on a local petroleum 
refinery. He concludes that marketable permits are an attractive 
alternative for meeting environmental quality objectives. 
The early studies which simulate the workings of a market in 
tradable permits generally define a right in terms of emissions. As 
noted above, it would be useful to know if significant savings result 
from defining permits in terms of ambient concentrations. Atkinson and 
Lewis (1974) attack this problem from a slightly different perspective 
for the case of airborne particulate matter in the St. Louis Air 
Quality Region. Using a linear program which minimizes control costs, 
the authors found that exploiting the difference in contributions to 
ambient concentrations from different sources can lead to a 50 percent 
savings over a strategy which treats all emissions alike. While the 
potential savings are great, according to the model, nine markets 
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(corresponding to the different receptors) would be needed to realize 
the full cost savings. 
The most comprehensive study to date on the feasibility of 
marketable permits was completed by Anderson et al. (1979). The 
analysis examines alternative policies for attaining a short-term N0 2 
standard in Chicago, and concludes that marketable permits present the 
most attractive alternative. A calculation similar to the one done by 
Atkinson and Lewis reveals that cost savings on the order of 90 percent 
could be obtained by using source-specific charges instead of a uniform 
emissions tax. Even if charges were based on source categories, the 
authors estimate savings in the neighborhood of 50 percent. While 
differential charges may lead to a lower cost solution, it is also 
quite probable that they would lead to unnecessary regulatory delay 
resulting from differences of opinion over the appropriate charge. In 
any event, it is unlikely the political system would accept such a 
complex pricing scheme. 
From the perspective of the policymaker, a serious omission in 
the analysis by Anderson et al. is that the air quality modeling of N0 2 
formation does not incorporate what is currently understood about 
atmospheric processes. For example, their model does not adequately 
describe the highly nonlinear chemical conversion processes which lead 
to N0
2 
formation. When coupled with the fact that the pollutant 
dispersion model is designed primarily for applications involving 
nonreactive pollutants, their air quality results require careful 
scrutiny. If further modeling studies are to be performed which may 
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have an impact on policy, they should reflect the current understanding 
of atmospheric processes as well as a reasoned analysis of the key 
economic and political questions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and state and local 
environmental regulatory agencies are increasingly being confronted 
with the harsh reality that the current standards system is not working 
very well. Not only are critics pointing to the whopping price tags on 
many projected investments designed to curb pollution, but in some 
instances, it can also be shown that environmental quality is 
deteriorating. While the environmental regulatory agencies are hardly 
to blame for this alleged state of affairs, they are in the unenviable 
position of having to take the political flak. 
As the debate intensifies, it appears that agencies at both the 
federal and state level are willing to experiment with alternative 
modes of environmental regulation. In some cases, such as the 
Connecticut plan, the regulation is designed primarily to ensure that 
standards will be met. 1 Other tools, such as bubbles and offsets are 
aimed at both reducing environmental control costs while making 
marginal strides in the direction of improving environmental quality. 
The bubble focuses on a single firm with one or several plants with 
several emissions sources. It is designed to allow the firm to 
increase emissions beyond the current standard at one location if it 
makes a greater reduction in emissions somewhere else. Offsets are 
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similar, but typically apply to more than one firm. They allow a firm 
to add new emissions if it pays for a greater reduction in emissions 
somewhere else in the same area. 2 
With the stepped-up search for viable alternatives, the time 
would seem ripe for a detailed evaluation of the feasibility of a 
tradable permit scheme for a particular pollution problem in a well 
defined region. A careful comprehensive analysis will require several 
components drawing on different disciplines. In the case of air 
pollution, a model needs to be used which links emissions and resulting 
air quality both spatially and temporally. For an actual application, 
it is imperative that the model be validated. All past studies which I 
have seen give scant attention to this issue. This is actually 
somewhat ironic given the amount of effort devoted to demonstrating the 
increased gains from exploiting the emissions-air quality relationship. 
If the model is not validated, there is no way of guessing the errors 
associated with estimates of potential cost savings. 
The air quality model must be linked with abatement cost data to 
determine the quantity of permits to be issued and the appropriate 
definition. To be relevant, practical issues such as monitoring, 
enforcement, and administrative costs must be considered. The study by 
Anderson et al. (1979) exemplifies the type of work that needs to be 
done in these areas. The issue of ensuring a competitive market or at 
least a workable market must be carefully assessed. To date little 
work has been done which examines how different types of trading rules 
may serve to promote a viable market. Several authors do not see 
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competition as a problem. For example, Teitenberg (1980), in his 
survey of the literature, asserts "anti-competitive effects of a TDP 
[transferable discharge permit] system are not likely to be very 
important in general."3 Be that as it may, this is a very real concern 
to most policymakers which should be given adequate consideration. 
The current mode of environmental regulation is rather crude. 
Loosely, it can be viewed as a give-and-take process where regulators 
attempt to clamp down tighter on source emissions as new technologies 
become available. It would be naive to presume that this system will 
be replaced with a finely tuned complex market mechanism which is 
cost-effective. It would be more realistic to strive for a system 
which redirects incentives away from large legal expenditures aimed at 
fostering regulatory delay, and towards a system which enlists the aid 
of polluting industries in searching for less expensive ways to meet 
prescribed environmental quality objectives. To move industry in this 
direction, it is incumbent upon the researcher to not only outline 
desirable economic alternatives, but also to outline proposals which 
will receive the backing of a majority of the participants. Such 
proposals should be easy to understand and give careful consideration 
to how the spoils will be distributed. 
18 
Footnotes for Chapter 2 
1. See Clark (1978) for a sunnnary of the Connecticut plan. 
2. Payment is not formally required, and sometimes offsets 
are given away by local or state governments in an attempt 
to induce firms to locate there. Liroff (1980) provides a 
more precise definition of these terms along with a discussion 
of how these policy tools evolved. 
3. Teitenberg (1980), p. 414. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MARKETABLE PERMITS: WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS ABOUT? 
Recently, both state and federal pollution control agencies have 
begun to direct their attention towards more economical alternatives 
which would meet environmental objectives. 1 While it has been shown 
that schemes which offer firms greater choice in selecting abatement 
alternatives have the potential to significantly reduce the overall 
cost of meeting prescribed environmental goals, the response of 
industry, the public and even regulators has been, at best, lukewarm. 
What might be the cause of this less-than-overwhelming response to new 
approaches for controlling pollution such as bubbles, offsets or 
marketable permits? There would appear tc be two key reasons for the 
cool reception. The first results from a lack of familiarity with the 
new regimes. The "command and control" technique currently employed is 
a well-seasoned approach which industry, regulators, and the public 
have dealt with on many occasions. It is possible that, in moving to 
an incentive-based approach, significant transitional costs would be 
incurred. A second reason for not adopting such schemes is that 
distributional issues may take precedence over efficiency 
considerations for many of the key industrial participants. 
This paper examines the problem of implementation for one 
particular alternative for dealing with pollution problems--marketable 
permits. The first part of the essay develops a simple framework for 
identifying implementation problems and points out several potential 
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problem areas which need to be addressed. The second part of the essay 
addresses these issues using the specific example of setting up a 
market for controlling sulfur oxides emissions (SO ) in a well defined x 
air quality region. 
3.1 Developing~ Framework 
As a starting point it is useful to construct a situation in 
which all firms would prefer a marketable permit scheme to a standards 
regime. The next step is to examine how real world considerations are 
at variance with the assumptions used to construct the example. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between levels of 
abatement and control cost for a composite variable called "air 
pollution". The curve passing through points Band C represents the 
minimum total cost of achieving a given level of abatement. Because of 
the difficulties in obtaining information on the nature of the least 
cost solution, it is typically thought that regulation leaves us at an 
inefficient point such as A. Since pollution associated with the 
existing situation usually exceeds the prescribed standard, let point C 
correspond to the target level of air pollution. 
We wish to consider whether it is possible to devise a marketable 
permit scheme which allows us to move from point A to point C, and 
which would be preferred by all industrial participants. First 
consider the simpler problem of moving to a marketable permit scheme at 
the current level of pollution. This is represented by a move from A 
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ignored, then it would be possible to move to a transferable rights 
scheme by issuing each firm an amount of permits which just equals 
their current level of emissions. This system of "grandfathering" the 
rights would be at least as good as the outcome under standards for 
some firms and unambiguously better for at least one firm (since the 
move from A to B implies that the overall level of abatement 
expenditures would be reduced). 
The analysis of the situation in which the target air quality 
standard is more stringent (e.g., moving from A to C) is essentially 
similar to the argument given above, but requires one further 
assumption. We must assume that the distribution of rights under the 
standards approach is known for the level of pollution associated with 
C. With this assumption, it is sufficient to grandfather the rights in 
amounts which equal what they would have been under the standards 
regime. Under such a market scheme, all firms could be made at least 
as well off as they would be under a standards regime in which the 
rights to emit are nonnegotiable, since in the latter case, the air 
qu~lity standard would be reached at a higher cost such as point D. 
Two important factors ignored in the above analysis are the 
implications of uncertainty surrounding the rules to be promulgated by 
the agency, and the possibility that interested groups could influence 
the outcome. When these features are considered, the case for 
convincing industry that it is in their interest to adopt a marketable 
permit scheme is considerably weakened. 
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For the case in which the level of air pollution remains 
unchanged and rights are grandfathered, industry might balk at the 
marketable permit idea for several reasons. One reason mentioned 
earlier is that use of a market to reach environmental goals is vastly 
different from the standards approach. Another possible objection is 
that grandfathering the rights is unfair because it tends to penalize 
those groups who have worked hardest to reduce their emissions. 
Finally, industry might argue that restrictions on trading combined 
with regulatory delay might lead to a system no better than the present 
situation, just different. 2 
If a marketable permit system is used to improve air quality over 
current levels, this introduces additional grounds for objecting to 
such a system. For example, industry might feel that the pollution 
level associated with points C and D might never be met under a 
standards approach or that it would take a much longer time to reach 
the target. In either case, the discounted present value of staying at 
inefficient point A, with perhaps some chance of moving to inefficient 
point D in the future, could be less than the cost of immediately 
moving to C. Decreasing the level of pollution also makes the initial 
distribution problem that much more difficult, since it is virtually 
impossible to know how firms would have fared if standards had remained 
in place. 
Movement to a marketable permit scheme also raises significant 
issues for regulators and the public. The regulatory agency must be 
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capable of making the transition. Resistance to change can be 
expected. The agency may have to augment its monitoring and 
enforcement staff to obtain more accurate measurements of emissions 
which could stand up in court. The economic tradeoff which must be 
considered is whether the increased administrative costs would be 
offset by the expected cost savings in abatement.3 For the market to 
work, the agency would have to develop trading rules which are 
comprehensible and allow several firms to participate. 
The preceding list of objections might lead to the conclusion 
that the prospects for adopting this alternative in the near future are 
bleak. On the contrary, the prospects for adopting this alternative 
are very good indeed. This is especially true for pollutants which are 
not heavily regulated. A case in point would be nonaerosol 
chlorofluorocarbons. 4 
The basic reason for the growing possibility of actually 
experimenting with marketable permits is the increasingly widespread 
dissatisfaction among environmentalists, industry and regulators with 
the existing standards regime~that is, if point A is bad enough, the 
objections can be overcome. Industry finds the red tape and 
uncertainty very costly while regulators and environmentalists are 
dissatisfied with the progress in abating pollution. Since marketable 
permits are known to possess desirable properties in theory and appear 
to be workable for several practical applications, experimentation with 
this approach may be just around the corner. 
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The Environmental Protection Agency has developed several limited 
variants of a tradable permit system that are being applied 
experimentally around the nation. These are: 
(1) Bubbles: a single plant that has several emissions ·sources 
may be permitted to increase emissions beyond the current 
standard at one location if it makes a greater reduction in 
emissions somewhere else at the same facility;S 
(2) Offsets: a firm may add new emissions in a geographic area 
if it pays for a greater reduction in emissions somewhere 
else in the same area; and 
(3) Banks: a firm that reduces its emissions below the 
applicable standard may deposit as a credit some fraction of 
its excess emissions reductions in an emissions bank. These 
banked emission credits can then be sold to some other firm 
that seeks emission permits. 
All of these policies are designed to introduce some flexibility into 
the means by which firms comply with environmental regulations by 
introducing the possibility of trading emissions at one place for 
emissions somewhere else. In this sense they are conceptually similar 
to tradable permits, but all retain important elements of the 
standard-setting approach as well. Each trade requires regulatory 
approval, and the source using the traded permit assumes a burden of 
proof that the trade is consistent with overall environmental policy. 
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Current distinctions in the stringency of regulations between 
new and old sources are retained in all of these policies. Thus, 'firms 
seeking to locate an environmentally significant new source of 
emissions by acquiring offsets must still operate at lowest attainable 
emission rates. For new sources, the trading policies are regarded as 
a means for providing one additional possibility for entry where even 
compliance with new source performance standards would be insufficient 
to allow it. 
The new policies do not yet have well-defined rules and 
procedures governing transactions, nor in most cases a convenient 
institutional arrangement for facilitating them. The offset policy 
provides no formal procedure for informing prospective participants in 
an offset about the identity of potential partners, the likely cost of 
reducing their emissions, nor the expected price of their emissions 
permits. Each offset transaction is the result of bilateral 
negotiations outside of any formal institutional structure established 
by the government, except that the terms of the deal must be approved 
by environmental regulators. Emissions banks do have a formal record-
keeping method for tracking the amount and source of marketable 
emissions credits, but at present the formal rules and procedures 
regarding trades are still being worked out. 
A final problem with all three methods is that the long-term 
status of traded permits is not clear in any program. If environmental 
quality in any area falls short of the policy target, all permits--
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traded or not~are subject to revision; however the credits from 
sources that reduced emissions below standards requirements appear more 
likely to be confiscated or severely reduced in value than other 
permits do. For example, in listing the options available to a local 
air pollution control authority should a revision in permits be 
necessary, the EPA manual for setting up an emissions bank cites four 
alternatives: 
(1) A moratorium on the use of permits obtained from the 
emissions reduction credit bank; 
(2) On a source by source basis, a revision in the number of 
permits from the bank that are necessary to produce a unit of 
emissions at that source; 
(3) An across the board reduction in the amount of emissions 
permitted for a permit acquired through the bank; or 
(4) A forfeiture of all traded permits.6 
Thus, a traded emissions permit may have secondary regulatory status in 
comparison with an untraded permit, making the former less valuable. 
The possibility that traded permits will be treated this way will make 
firms reluctant to reduce emissions beyond current requirements in 
order to create marketable permits out of concern that their additional 
emissions reductions will be confiscated rather than made available to 
others. Potential trading partners will be equally reluctant to make 
long-term capital investments on the basis of emissions permits that 
have such an uncertain status. 
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The tradable permits system examined in the next section is a 
more radical institutional change than has thus far been contemplated 
by regulatory authorities. It would eliminate distinctions among 
sources because of age, ownership, industry or method of acquiring 
permits. It would simply establish a ceiling on total emissions within 
a geographic area, and it would allow the allocation of emissions among 
sources in the area to be determined solely by the market. No 
regulatory review of the methods used by any source or of the 
distribution of emissions permits among the sources would be 
undertaken. 
3.2 A. Potential Application 
To demonstrate the viability of marketable permits without 
actually implementing the alternative requires selecting a specific 
pollutant, identifying the key implementation problems, and then 
designing a market which will address these issues. As an example, the 
problem of controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region 
was selected. 7 This problem was chosen because it appeared to be a 
likely candidate for marketable permits. The scientific aspects of the 
problem are well understood. Data on sulfur oxides abatement costs are 
available or can be constructed for most of the key sources, and 
monitoring and enforcement problems appear tractable. 
The question at hand is whether such a market could actually 
work. First, the criteria for measuring the success of a market need 
to be specified. For this specific case we would like to design a 
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market that will meet air quality goals in a more cost-effective manner 
than the current system of source-specific standards, that will 
encourage investment in finding new abatement technologies for the 
future, and that will be legally and politically feasible. Legal 
feasibility means that the market must meet the requirements of 
relevant constitutional and statutory constraints. Political 
feasibility means that the regulatory agency should be capable of 
administering the program and that the approach has a reasonable chance 
of being acceptable enough to industry, the public and regulators that 
it stands a chance of being enacted by political officials. 
To meet air quality goals requires a good technical understanding 
of the problem. The particulate sulfate problem in Los Angeles is 
caused primarily by the combustion of sulfur-bearing energy products. 
Particulate sulfates are an important concern because they tend to 
reduce visibility, acidify rainwater, and may also have harmful health 
effects. The conversion of sulfur oxides emissions to sulfates in Los 
Angeles can be thought of as proceeding in three stages. First, sulfur 
enters the air basin. Virtually, all of the sulfur which man uses in 
the Los Angeles area enters in a barrel of crude oil. Second, when oil 





which is released to the atmosphere. Finally, 
the SOX compounds react to form sulfates through a series of 
atmospheric chemical processes. Cass (1978) has shown that the 
relation between sulfur oxides emissions and sulfate air quality in Los 
Angeles is approximately linear and, in addition, can be modeled as if 
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it were largely independent of the level of other key pollutants. 
Given a sulfate air quality objective, it will be possible to use an 
environmental model to compute the corresponding level of permissible 
. . 8 emi.s s ions • 
The current approach towards controlling sulfur oxides emissions 
relies on standards and an offset policy. New sources of pollution 
must trade off the uncontrolled portion of their emissions by effecting 
further reductions at existing sources in the Los Angeles Basin. The 
owner of an existing source is thus vested with a valuable property 
right which can be sold in whole or in part to new source owners. The 
owner also has the option of holding onto his current abatement 
possibilities to facilitate subsequent expansion. 
The off set policy is one limited form of a market in transferable 
licenses to emit air pollutants. Its principal drawbacks are that the 
costs of negotiation are excessive and the number of trades which can 
be made by new sources are limited. Negotiation costs are high because 
new entrants must first identify existing sources of pollution where 
emissions reductions are feasible, then try to estimate a reasonable 
charge for the offset, and finally perhaps have to purchase the entire 
business operations of some polluter. Purchases of offsets by new 
firms are limited by the requirement that new firms must reduce 
emissions to the lowest achievable level before being allowed to enter 
the offset market. Presumably, in a full-blown marketable permit 
scheme, all specific source by source restrictions on burning fuels 
containing sulfur would be lifted. This would tend to increase the 
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number of mutually beneficial trades. In addition, the market obviates 
the need for bilateral bargaining, which is cumbersome and unnecessary. 
By conveying a uniform price for a permit, the market also ensures that 
rights will go to the highest bidder, and the marginal value of a right 
owned by a firm will approximate the market price. 
While a marketable permit approach can attain a least cost 
solution, this cannot be assumed. In constructing a market in sulfur 
oxides emissions permits for Los Angeles, care has to be taken to 
ensure that a few firms will not be able to dominate. Table 1 gives 
some indication of the relative market shares of sulfur oxides 
emissions in 1973 and projected shares for the early 1980s under a low 
natural gas scenario. The low natural gas scenario is essentially a 
worst case because the absence of industrial natural gas means that 
fuel with higher sulfur content will be burned. If this pattern of 
emissions is accurate, the electric utilities can be expected to 
account for the largest share of emissions. Note that mobile sources 
account for more than one-fourth of the total in the 1980s scenario. 
To force all mobile sources to participate in the market would, 
needless to say, be quite expensive. Fortunately, it may be possible 
to transfer this responsibility to local oil companies since they make 




PAST AND PROJECTED "MARKET SHARES" FOR SULFUR OXIDES EMISSIONS 
BY SOURCE TYPE FOR THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASINa 
1973 Emissions 
Source % o~ T~talb 
Type Emissions 
Utility 28 
Mobile Sources 16 
Utility 11 
Oil Company 8 
Steel Company 7 
Oil Company 3 
Coke Calcining Company 3 
Oil Company 3 
Oil Company 2 
Oil Company 2 
1980s Projection - low natural gas 
scenario and 1977 emissions 
control regulations 
Source % o~ T~ta1i, 
Type Emissions 
Utility 31 
Mobile Sources 27 
Utility 10 
Oil Company 4 
Coke Calcining Company 4 
Oil Company 3 
Steel Company 3 
Oil Company 3 
Oil Company 2 
Oil Company 2 
These figures are based on sources located within the 1974 
definition of geographic boundaries of the South Coast Air Basin 
(which was subsequently revised). 
bEmissions are rounded to the nearest percent. 
Source: Based on author's calculations from data used to compile 
Cass (1978) and Cass (1979). 
While a transition to a permit market will almost certainly imply 
different market shares from those presented above, the electric 
utilities can still be expected to have the largest share of the 
market. This presents some difficulties because even if the utilities 
act as cost minimizers their interaction with the public utilities 
commission rate-setting process might provide incentives towards 
investing in permits that differ from more conventional privately-held 
firms. The problem of predicting utility behavior in a permit market 
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is currently being investigated by examining how utilities treat other 
durable assets such as real estate, and by observing utility behavior 
under the current system of offsets and banking. 
Given that competition in such a market is not a foregone 
conclusion, it is important to ask what happens if some of the 
safeguards don't work and some of the firms successfully manipulate the 
price of a permit. While this would certainly affect the distribution 
of income and should be avoided if possible, it by no means renders the 
system a complete failure. In fact, so long as the market provides 
greater flexibility for firms wishing to locate in Los Angeles while 
maintaining the current level of air quality, this will be a big step 
forward over current policy. 
Some critics fear the market may not have a sufficient number of 
trades to be competitive. In the jargon of the economist, this is the 
problem of "thin" markets. The extreme case of a thin market is when 
no trading occurs. From a practical point of view, this lack of 
trading would be a concern even if firms in the area were at an 
equilibrium which minimized aggregate abatement costs. The concern 
stems from the observation that new firms wishing to enter the area 
would receive little information on the cost of entry. The solution to 
this problem is to devise a system which will give potential entrants a 
price signal when the market becomes too thin. One alternative whose 
properties are currently being investigated, is to have existing firms 
put a small percentage of their permits up for sale. Anyone wishing to 
bid on these permits, including existing participants, would be 
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encouraged to do so. Under such a scheme, new entrants would have a 
better idea of the cost of emitting sulfur oxides in Los Angeles. 
While questions of efficiency are important, distributional 
issues must also be addressed if the market is to become a politically 
viable entity. One important concern in moving to a market to control 
sulfur oxides air pollutants is the transitional costs which firms will 
face. Some firms or industries may be forced to shut down. For 
example, if a firm competes in a national market and faces an elastic 
demand for its product, it may be the case that the costs of entering a 
permit market could force it to move to another area where 
environmental regulations are less costly. Estimates of the likelihood 
of firm closings obtained so far indicate that plant closure will not 
b bl . h* *f * 9 e a pro em in t is speci ic case. If the policy maker wishes to 
avoid plant closings, this issue can be addressed through a suitable 
initial distribution of permits. 
To gain some perspective on the distribution problem, it is 
useful to have a qualitative estimate of the size of the "pie." 
Preliminary estimates of the total annual value of emissions (i.e., the 
price of a permit multiplied by the quantity issued) are in the 
neighborhood of 150 million dollars per year. 10 Assuming there are 
roughly 10 million people in the South Coast Air Basin implies that 
each person could receive 15 dollars per year if the permits were 
auctioned and the proceeds were distributed to the public. Some 
critics have argued that the magnitude of the potential wealth 
transfers involved does not bode well for marketable permits in the 
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political arena. While problems with distribution can be viewed as a 
barrier to implementation, there is an alternative view that control 
over the distribution of permits makes it that much more likely that a 
politically acceptable solution can be found. 
What is really at issue here is who will be given the property 
rights to the air, and for how long. It is quite likely that a large 
part of the resistance to emissions tax proposals is related to the 
realization that under most taxation schemes, emissions rights will 
revert back to the public domain. 11 This is, in essence, the nature of 
the excess burden or double taxation argument which states that it is 
unfair for industry to have to pay the tax and pay to clean up as well. 
The alleged inequity of the excess burden can be directly addressed in 
a marketable permit scheme. In the extreme case, all permits could be 
given to industry if that were deemed fair or necessary to enlist 
industry's cooperation. Alternatively, some or all of the permits 
could be auctioned with proceeds returned to the public or used to 
finance administrative costs. The basic point is that adopting a 
marketable permits approach provides a great deal of flexibility in 
addressing distributional issues. 
The final question which needs to be addressed is whether the 
infrastructure exists to handle a marketable permits scheme. There is 
currently a nominal emissions fee system in place for the South Coast 
Air Basin. Each firm is required to complete a form analogous to an 
income tax form which gives annual emissions for air contaminants which 
are subject to the fee. The principal purpose of the fee system is to 
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cover a part of the operating cost of the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District (AQMD). For example, during the 1980-81 fiscal 
year, fees can be expected to cover about 30 percent of the projected 
20 million dollar budget. 12 Sulfur oxides emissions are one of five 
air pollutants which come under the fee system. The charge for 
emitting a ton of sulfur oxides is $21. 13 This can be compared with a 
permit price which is estimated to be in the neighborhood of $1,000 per 
ton for the case in which sulfur oxides emissions remain at their 
present levels. Though the AQMD currently handles all disputes over 
emissions fees within the agency, when the price of emissions increases 
by one or two orders of magnitude, it is quite likely that the courts 
will play some role in settling disputes. 
The problem is to figure out how to minimize the role of the 
courts. One way is by carefully defining a permit in terms which can 
be monitored. Two obvious choices are to define a permit in terms of 
a short-term maximum emissions rate such as a pound per hour, or in 
terms of a cumulative measure of emissions over a longer time interval. 
For the case of sulfur oxides emissions it would probably be preferable 
to define a permit in terms of cumulative emissions over a time 
interval such as a week or a month, but there is a problem in 
monitoring sources that do not route all of their sulfur input to the 
air. Integrated stack monitors do not exist which would provide the 
necessary information to demonstrate that a violation has actually 
occurred. On the other hand, the technology for determining whether 
such sources have violated a short-term maximum emission rate does 
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exist. This can be accomplished by a team of 4 or 5 technicians 
performing a source test. 
The monitoring and enforcement of a marketable permit scheme to 
control sulfur oxides emissions is within the grasp of the AQMD. It is 
a relatively straightforward matter to monitor cumulative emissions for 
utilities and the majority of industrial sources who do not use any 
abatement equipment for reducing sulfur oxides emissions. The only 
information that is required to estimate emissions is the quantity of 
fuel burned and the sulfur content of the fuel. For those sources who 
do not route all of the sulfur input into the air, the task is less 
straightforward. The major sources in this category include the oil 
refiners, coke calciners, glass manufacturers and steel manufacturers. 
There are two basic approaches which can be used to monitor stack 
emissions. One is the source test performed by technicians. The 
second is to install monitoring equipment which indicates the 
concentration of sulfur oxides within a small area in the stack. 
Unfortunately, without some measure of the exhaust gas flow rate, it is 
impossible to know t~e cumulative emissions. While the use of stack 
monitors for measuring SO is still in its infancy and the estimates x 
are not always reliable, they may be used as a continuous check to 
determine when a firm's emissions appear to exceed the quantity of 
permits it holds. 
There are currently about 20 continuous stack monitors in place 
and 100 are expected to be in place by the end of 1980 in the South, 
A. . 14 Coast ir Basin. One possibility for enforcing the SO permit scheme x 
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is to sample firms at random to see if they are in violation. This 
random sampling approach could be augmented by a program which uses the 
information provided by the continuous monitoring system installed in 
many of the larger sources. 
There are some legal problems which need to be addressed in the 
implementation phase. For example, it is not clear whether under 
current law the AQMD can penalize violators by fining them in accord 
with the severity of the violation. It would be desirable to have a 
system of fines which could be administratively imposed in order to 
minimize the role of the courts. In addition, the question of who 
should be given the burden of proof needs to be addressed. The current 
reporting system for emissions is analogous to federal income tax 
reporting with the polluter responsible for substantiating his claims 
when the AQMD estimates differ with those submitted by the polluter. 
The exact form of the fine raises some interesting issues. 
First, consider the objectives in designing a penalty system. The 
l>asic objective is to provide firms with a strong incentive to play by 
the rules so the air quality target will be met. But, how strong an 
incentive? Clearly, if the penalties were made high enough and there 
were some probability of getting caught, all firms would play by the 
rules. There is a question, however, both from a legal and an 
administrative perspective, as to how high you can make the penalties 
and still have them be workable. If the penalties far exceed the 
estimated damages, the courts are not likely to uphold them and the 
regulators might be reluctant to impose them. Such might be the case 
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if all violations were to be punished by closing down the plant. Thus, 
in addition to providing an incentive for firms not to exceed their 
allowed emissions, a penalty scheme should be enforceable. 
There are no magic formulas for determining an appropriate 
penalty scheme. The basic theoretical approach is to try to maximize 
the difference between social benefits and social costs. 
Operationally, this is not very helpful. If the firm's violation is 
viewed as marginal, then a less grandiose objective might be to equate 
the firm's marginal benefit from the violation with the marginal cost 
to society of allowing such a violation. The firm's marginal benefit 
can be estimated by members of the firm, but, in all likelihood, is not 
public information. The marginal damage to society of such a violation 
is anybody's guess, but can usefully be separated into two components: 
the probability of getting caught, p, given that a firm is in 
violation, and the damage due to a violation, D. 
Quantification of damages is always difficult. For illustrative 
purposes suppose that damages are a function, f, of the size of the 
difference between monitored emissions and permits currently held by 
the firm. Call this difference x so that damages are represented by 
D=f(x). Let F be the size of the fine in dollars and let 2 be the 
price of a marketable permit. Equation (3.1) represents a preliminary 
attempt to link the fine to damages, the probability of getting caught 
when in violation and the existing price for polluting, t. 




The numerator of equation (3.1) represents an estimate of the monetary 
value of damages. Dividing through by p gives a measure of expected 
damages. Thus, the firm is supposed to compare its expected marginal 
benefits with expected damages. 
Equation (3.1) suffers from one serious flaw. Such a penalty 
system can be circumvented by driving down the price of a permit. This 
situation could arise if a sufficiently large number of firms chose not 
to participate in the market, and pay the penalty instead. Equation 
(3.1) is easily modified to deal with this issue. Let "a" be a 
parameter set by the regulator which could reflect the expected market 
price of a permit if all firms were to participate in the market. This 
gives rise to equation (3.2) which captures the spirit of (3.1), but 
does not fall prey to manipulation as easily. 
F = f(x) Max(a,i) 
p 
(3.2) 
In Equation (3 .2), "Max" denotes the maximum of a and Q. • Thus, at a 
minimum, a firm caught in violation would have to pay f(x)a/p. 
If damages are measured in terms of emissions, then a second 
potential difficulty with equations (3.1) and (3.2) is that profit 
maximizing firms may be indifferent between obeying and not obeying the 
terms of a permit. The nature of the damage function, f(x), needs to 
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be spelled out. If the objective is to keep firms close to their 
permit levels, then it makes sense to increase the marginal cost when 
the size of the violation increases. This is easily accomplished by 
letting f (x) = Kxn where K is an arbitrary constant and n exceeds 
unity. Substitution into (3.2) yields: 
F a Kxn Max(a,t) 
p 
(3.3) 
Equation (3.3) is offered merely as one possibility for designing 
a penalty scheme. It has the virtue that it is simple, and all the 
parameters can be estimated, at least roughly. Furthermore, it crudely 
relates benefits to costs, and also would appear to be consistent with 
the postulated objectives for a penalty system. 
The point of going through this exercise of designing a fee was 
to demonstrate a general approach to the problem as well as to note 
some of the difficulties in moving from theory to practice. The above 
formulation is simplistic. It assumes away many of the measurement 
problems. For example, there is obviously some uncertainty in 
measuring x. Nevertheless, it is our belief that source tests are 
sufficiently accurate to warrant a penalty design which assesses fines 
which are commensurate with the size of the violation. Another problem 
is that p is really an endogenous variable, which depends on the 
penalty scheme actually adopted, making it difficult to estimate before 
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implementation begins. In addition, the probability of detection may 
vary with the size of the violation, and the resources devoted to 
monitoring and enforcement. 
The detailed design of a penalty system will require further 
distinctions not made here. For example, firms who report violations 
should be subject to less severe penalties than firms who do not. In 
particular, the costs of monitoring and enforcement should fall more 
heavily on those firms who do not truthfully report their emissions. 
One possibility would be to set p equal to unity for firms reporting 
violations. In actuality, firms caught cheating on their reported 
emissions could be subject to other civil or criminal sanctions, 
similar to those imposed by the Internal Revenue Service. 
The first objective in designing a penalty scheme was to induce 
firms not to exceed the allowable level of emissions most of the time. 
However, it was recognized that there may be unforeseen circumstances, 
such as an equipment failure, when a firm might violate its emission 
limit for a short time. Just as it is important to identify 
extenuating circumstances for the individual firm, it is also important 
to identify situations where a marketable permit scheme may be 
inappropriate. For the case of SO emissions in Los Angeles, there are x 
two types of uncertainty which can be expected to strain the system. 
The first is the unpredictability of the natural gas supply. The 
permit scheme can handle this uncertainty in two ways: either by 
forcing industry to deal with this uncertainty or providing some relief 
in the form of issuing temporary permits should a crisis situation 
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arise. The second major area of uncertainty is the problem of air 
pollution episodes which require dramatic action on the part of all 
participants. Because such events are very difficult to predict in 
advance, the best way of handling these situations is probably to 
suspend the permit system and invoke tighter regulations during these 
brief periods. 
The preceding discussion indicates that it will be possible to 
design a market in tradable SO emission permits for Los Angeles. 
x 
Monitoring and enforcement capabilities currently exist, but will 
probably have to be expanded. A fee system needs to be worked out in 
detail which will induce firms not to exceed their allowed level of 
emissions. In addition, the problem of obtaining revenues to 
administer the market must be addressed. One simple solution is to set 
a nominal fee on SO emissions analogous to the 21 dollar/ton fee which x 
is applied now. Such a fee could be expected to lower the permit price 
by the discounted value of the fee. 
3.3. Conclusions 
In a world not beset by uncertainty, but befuddled by pollution 
problems, it was possible to construct an example in which marketable 
permits were preferable to standards. In the real world in which we 
live, the comparison is less straightforward. There are transitional 
costs in moving to a new system. Not all firms will necessarily be 
winners in moving to a marketable permit scheme. It is possible that 
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firms may face higher abatement costs than under standards for the 
simple .reason that the air quality goals may be reached more quickly. 
Despite these objections, there appears to be an increasing 
willingness on the part of all groups to experiment with new kinds of 
environmental regulation. This enthusiasm is derived, in part, from 
the observation that the command and control approach is not working 
for many problems. It is burdensome administratively, and even though 
industry can sometimes foster delays in enacting regulations, the 
attendant uncertainties can be very expensive for firms who have long-
term planning horizons. It might be the case that coalitions can be 
formed which are willing to consider alternatives such as marketable 
permits which can provide greater certainty. 
If regulatory agencies decide to experiment with marketable 
permits, it is of paramount importance that some assurances be placed 
on the minimum duration of a permit. In addition, trading rules need 
to be spelled out clearly. If environmental agencies adopt a 
marketable permits approach and change the rules capriciously, they run 
the risk of losing support for a tool which can be a most-effective 
means of controlling pollution problems. 
The importance of selecting the right problem cannot be 
overemphasized. It is helpful to have an understanding of the 
relationship between emissions and ambient pollutant levels so the 
target can be attained without having to iterate frequently. A 
monitoring and enforcement capability is imperative. Many 
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environmental regulatory agencies currently do not have the resources 
or the expertise to successfully monitor and implement a marketable 
permit scheme. The final element necessary to assess the viability of 
the marketable permit alternative is an estimate of what it will cost 
industry to clean up the problem. This information can be used to 
identify implementation problems and design a market which will address 
these issues. 
46 
Footnotes for Chapter 3 
* The work reported here was supported in part by the California Air 
Resources Board. This paper has benefited from discussions with 
Jim Krier, Eric Lemke and Roger Noll. The views expressed herein, 
including any remaining errors, are solely the responsibility of 
the author. 
1. Krier and Bell (1980) provide an insightful discussion on the 
relationship between some of the new approaches being proposed 
such as bubbles, offsets and marketable permits, and the 
traditional approaches to environmental regulation. 
2. A summary of industry's skeptical perspective on the bubble 
policy which supports this view is contained in Environment 
Reporter (1980). 
3. Both the study by Anderson et al. (1979) and the study by 
Palmer et al. (1980) indicate that expected cost savings are 
much greater than any expected increase in administrative costs. 
It should be noted that in some cases administrative costs 
could actually decrease. One potentially important source of 
savings for the application considered here is the decrease 
in resources devoted to evaluating whether a proposed source 
would meet the standard. 
4. This is the subject of the Rand study prepared for the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
S. Recently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has extended 
this concept to include "multi-plant" bubbles, which is conceptually 
similar to the offset method. 
6. ICF (1980), p. 26. 
7. The Los Angeles region refers to the South Coast Air Basin and 
a part of Ventura County. The current definition of the South 
Coast Air Basin includes all of Orange County, the majority of 
Los Angeles County and parts of San Bernardino and Riverside 
County. See Cass (1978) for a more precise definition. 
8. See Cass (1978) for a description of the model and the validation 
procedure. 
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9. There are two possible exceptions to this conclusion--a large steel 
manufacturer which may close down before the system could get 
underway, and the glass manufacturers who account for less than 
1% of current emissions, but have very high abatement costs. It 
appears that both of these problems could easily be handled through 
a distribution scheme that is politically acceptable. 
10. The calculations and methodology for obtaining these estimates 
are explained in Hahn (1981). 
11. This point may need further clarification for readers with a legal 
perspective on the issue. In a legal sense, it may be true that the 
public has a claim on such rights. The point made here is that 
regardless of who has the claim, industry is, de facto, exercising 
the right whenever it spews forth emissions which are sanctioned 
by law. 
12. Based on interview with Eric Lemke (1980). 
13. Small emitters as defined in Rule 301 of the Rules and Regulations 
of the South Coast AQMD are exempted. SO is measured in x 
equivalent tons of so2. 
14. Based on interview with Eric Lemke (1980). 
15. This upper bound estimate is based on the assumption that up to 
25 or 30 more technicians might need to be hired. 
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CHAPTER 4 
* DESIGNING MARKET MECHANISMS TO CONTROL POLLUTION 
4.1 Introduction 
A conventional economic analysis of the standards approach to 
environmental regulation indicates that it falls short on two counts. 
In the short run, standards fail to meet environmental objectives in a 
cost-effective manner because regulators do not have sufficient 
information on feasible abatement strategies and their attendant costs. 
In the long run, standards provide little incentive for firms to search 
for innovations in abatement technology. With such telling criticisms, 
the question naturally arises as to whether there might be some better 
way of meeting a prescribed set of environmental policy objectives that 
is politically feasible. This paper examines one candidate which has 
been suggested as a viable alternative to the existing mode of 
regulation. The general idea is to set up a market where rights to 
emit one or several pollutants can be bought and sold, in much the same 
way shares of General Motors stock are exchanged on Wall Street. The 
rules of the market would require that firms hold a quantity of permits 
equal to or in excess of their emissions. This approach has been 
referred to by several names including marketable permits, transferable 
rights and tradable licenses. The principal objective of this essay 
will be to characterize how such a market might work in a specific 
application and, in so doing, point out areas of research which might 
be helpful in assessing both the feasibility and relative merits of a 
marketable permit scheme. 
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The scholarly literature on the properties of a system of 
tradable emissions permits has examined in detail the theoretical 
advantages and problems of this approach. Examples include Dales 
(1968), Montgomery (1972), Roberts and Spence (1976), and Teitenberg 
(1980). A competitive market in emissions permits will achieve the 
given emissions target at minimum cost (assuming that the permits can 
be enforced) and will provide a continuing incentive to pursue cost-
reducing innovations in abatement technology, advantages that are also 
characteristic of emissions taxes. In addition, they do not 
necessarily require that the government collect fees for allowable 
emissions (the permits can be given away), and they cause the 
uncertainties associated with environmental policy to be focused more 
on the total costs of the policy and less on the equilibrium quantity 
of emissions, in contrast with emissions taxes. Finally, in comparison 
to other methods of environmental regulation, they generally impose 
less demanding information requirements on regulators. 
A major question concerning the feasibility of an efficient 
permits market is whether a competitive market can be established. One 
potential problem is that one or a few sources of pollution will 
account for such a high proportion of emissions that the permits market 
will be imperfectly competitive, preventing the market from allocating 
permits in a manner that minimizes total abatement costs due to 
strategic market behavior by the major polluters. Another potential 
problem arises from the geographic specificity of both emissions and 
damages from pollution. Each receptor is polluted by numerous sources 
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whose emissions interact to produce unique effects at every receptor 
point. To achieve maximum efficiency (ignoring transactions costs), a 
separate market would have to be established for pollution at each 
receptor, and each firm would have to know the effects of its emissions 
on every receptor in order to buy the appropriate combination of 
permits. 
This essay will focus on the key empirical results which emerge 
from an analysis of the cost and air quality data for a particular 
problem~the control of sulfur oxides emissions in the Los Angeles 
airshed. The central issue is whether a market for emissions permits 
can be established that produces a more efficient combfnation of 
emissions and abatement strategies than the traditional regulatory 
approach. Because this is an empirical question, it is examined in the 
context of a particular example. Nevertheless, the analysis should be 
of general interest because it addresses a set of questions that must 
be answered in order to make a tradable permits system a practical 
alternative anywhere. 
The tradable permits system examined here is a more radical 
institutional change than has thus far been adopted by regulatory 
authorities,. The "controlled trading options" developed by EPA since 
the passage of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977-so-called bubbles, 
off sets and emissions banks-start with the existing regulatory 
structure as a baseline, and overlay the possibility of trades on it 
(see Hahn and Noll (1981)). Detailed regulatory reviews of each source 
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and of emissions trades are obtained. Moveover, traded permits have a 
somewhat clouded, secondary status in relation to untraded permits. 
The approach examined here replaces the existing regulatory 
system with a far more flexible system. It would eliminate 
distinctions among sources because of age, ownership, industry or 
method of acquiring permits. It would simply establish a ceiling on 
total emissions within a geographic area, and it would allow the 
allocation of emissions among sources in the area to be determined 
solely by the market. No regulatory review of the methods used by any 
source nor of the distribution of emissions permits among the sources 
would be undertaken. Policy issues relating to the differential air 
quality effects of different geographical distributions of emissions 
permits would be dealt with by the way in which trading regions were 
defined, and by the rules for tradirtg across regional boundaries, as 
will be discussed below. The role of the government would be reduced 
to the following activities: (1) establish ambient air quality 
standards; (2) determine the total amount of emissions that is 
consistent with the air quality standard; (3) issue permits and 
maintain a market for them; and (4) enforce the emissions limits by 
ascertaining whether each source is emitting pollutants at a level at 
or below the quantity of permits it holds, and by imposing 
noncompliance penalties. 
Regulators also may wish to use direct regulation, rather than a 
tradable permits system, to deal with air pollution "episodes." 
Meteorological conditions have an important effect on the relationship 
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between emissions and air quality. One approach to this problem is to 
have several different permit systems, each of which pertains to a 
particular weather pattern. The separate permits systems would 
correspond to the present multiple stage "alert" system. 
Alternatively, the tradable permits system could apply only to normal 
conditions, and direct regulation could be used to deal with emergency 
conditions. Our study has assumed the latter approach for the present 
simply to avoid unnecessary complexity. Later, if and when the 
feasibility of tradable permits is demonstrated for the normal case, 
attention can be turned to a special permit system for emergency 
conditions. 
Ideally a market in permits would have a large number of buyers 
and sellers who actively trade permits, quickly establish a market 
price for permits that is close to the long-run equilibrium, and take 
actions that minimize abatement costs and distribute emissions 
geographically and temporally such that ambient air quality standards 
are met. As a practical matter, certain tradeoffs may have to be made 
in terms of the design features of the system. 
For example, a fairly fine-tuned definition of the times and 
places at which a permit can be used may produce too few participants 
in each market to guarantee an efficient outcome; however a broader 
geographic and temporal definition of a permit may be consistent with 
numerous substantially different patterns of pollution from the same 
amount of total emissions. Consequently, in defining the boundaries 
within which a permit will be valid, it is useful to have both a good 
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model of the relationships between emissions and ambient air quality, 
and a good approximation of how the market is likely to distribute 
permits among sources. This enables one to predict the air quality 
results that are likely to come about from alternative ways of 
organizing the permits market. 
In order to predict how permits--and, therefore, emissions--are 
likely to be distributed, one needs to know the demand for permits by 
each source. This requires being able to make a reasonable estimate of 
the abatement cost function faced by each major source. From this 
information, one can derive the cost-minimizing combination of permits 
and abatement that would result from different long-run prices for 
permits. This yields a demand curve for permits for the cost-
minimizing firm. 
Similar types of calculations are needed to answer questions 
about market structure issues. In order to determine whether the 
market will be sufficiently competitive to produce an efficient result, 
one needs to be able to forecast the final distribution of permits. If 
one or a few sources can be expected to hold a large fraction of the 
permits, the market for permits may have monopolistic features that 
undermine its efficiency. To predict the concentration of ultimate 
permits holdings also requires solving the cost-minimizing problem for 
participants in the market. From this, one can predict the equilibrium 
price of a permit. Knowing the price, one can then use the abatement 
cost functions to predict a final distribution of the permits. In 
similar fashion, cost data are essential for determining whether cost-
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minimizing abatement will alter the industrial structure of an area. 
They are also needed to figure out whether a short-run disequilibrium 
in the permits market could force relocation or bankruptcy of some 
firms that would continue to operate locally if the equilibrium price 
were established quickly. 
4.2 1§.. Implementation Feasible? 
To demonstrate the viability of marketable permits without 
actually implementing the alternative requires selecting a specific 
pollutant, identifying the key implementation problems, and then 
designing a market which will address these issues. As an example, the 
problem of controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region 
was selected.1 This problem was chosen because it appeared to be a 
likely candidate for marketable permits. The scientific aspects of the 
problem are well understood. Data on sulfur oxides abatement costs are 
available or can be constructed for most of the key sources, and 
monitoring and enforcement problems appear tractable. 
The current approach towards controlling sulfur oxides emissions 
in Los Angeles relies on standards, an offset policy, and a modest 
emissions fee. New sources of pollution must adopt the best available 
technology, and must trade off the uncontrolled portion of their 
emissions by effecting further reductions at existing sources in the 
Los Angeles Basin. The owner of an existing source is thus vested with 
a valuable property right which can be sold in whole or in part to new 
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sources. The owner also has the option of retaining the opportunity 
for further abatement to facilitate subsequent expansion. 
As discussed above, the offset policy is one limited form of a 
market in transferable permits to emit air pollutants. Its principal 
drawbacks are that the costs of negotiation are excessive and the 
number of trades which can be made by new sources are limited, and, in 
any case, sources must satisfy technical standards before and after 
trades. Negotiation costs are high because new entrants must first 
identify existing sources of pollution where emissions reductions are 
feasible, then try to estimate a reasonable charge for the offset, and, 
finally, perhaps have to purchase the entire business operations of 
some polluter to obtain its emissions rights. Moreover, gains from 
trade are limited to the extent that differences in technical standards 
after trades among source categories produce substantial differences in 
marginal abatement costs. 
The question at hand is whether a market for sulfur emissions 
permits could improve matters. First, the criteria for measuring the 
success of a market need to be specified. For this specific case we 
would like to design a market that will meet established air quality 
goals for particulate sulfates in a more cost-effective manner than the 
current system of source-specific standards, that will encourage 
investment in finding new abatement technologies for the future, and 
that will be legally and politically feasible. Legal feasibility means 
that the market must meet the requirements of relevant constitutional 
constraints, and be implementable without fundamental changes in the 
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performance objectives of existing statutes. Political feasibility 
means that the regulatory agency should be capable of administering the 
program, and that the approach has a reasonable chance of being 
sufficiently acceptable to industry, the public and regulators that it 
stands a chance of being enacted by public officials. 
To demonstrate feasibility requires a good technical 
understanding of the problem. The particulate sulfate problem in Los 
Angeles is caused primarily by the combustion of sulfur-bearing energy 
sources. Particulate sulfates are a regulatory concern because they 
reduce visibility, acidify rainwater, and may have harmful health 
effects. The conversion of sulfur oxides emissions to sulfates in Los 
Angeles can be thought of as proceeding in three stages. First, sulfur 
enters the air basin. Virtually all of the sulfur which is emitted in 
the Los Angeles area enters in a barrel of crude oil. Second, when oil 
products are refined or burned without controls, some of the sulfur 




and released to the 
atmosphere. Finally, the SO compounds react to form sulfates through x 
a series of atmospheric chemical processes. 
Cass (1978) has succeeded in constructing an emissions/air 
quality model for sulfate particulates in Los Angeles. He has shown 
that the relation between sulfur oxides emissions and sulfate air 
quality in Los Angeles is approximately linear and, in addition, can be 
modeled adequately as if it were largely independent of the level of 
other key pollutants. One feature of Cass's model is that mobile 
sources are treated as stationary sources by converting them to traffic 
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densities over the airshed. Because the most likely strategy for 
reducing sulfur oxides emissions from mobile sources is to reduce the 
sulfur content of fuels, regulation of mobile sources can be done 
indirectly by placing the responsibility on refiners. A tradable 
permits system could then require refiners to add refinery emissions to 
sulfur oxides emissions from mobile sources to determine the number of 
permits they must hold. 
A major task of the project was to estimate abatement cost 
functions for the primary sources of sulfur oxides emissions in Los 
Angeles. Over twenty-five source categories were identified, and 
abatement costs were estimated for each. The published literature, 
regulatory proceedings, and interviews with representatives of local 
industry and state and local regulatory personnel were relied upon to 
generate preliminary cost estimates. The information typically 
obtained from a particular source was a point estimate: the cost at 
some historical date of using a particular method to obtain a specific 
rate of emissions from a particular kind of facility. These were 
integrated to produce a step function for abatement costs for 
representative facilities in each source category based on 1977 
regulatory conditions, with corrections made to put the costs in 1977 
dollars. The results of these analyses were submitted as industry 
studies to the relevant firms operating in Los Angeles, with requests 
for comments. The additional data received in this manner are being 
used to produce a final emission control cost study, including 
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indications of the amount of disagreement about costs among the sources 
of information. 
A number of factors make these cost estima_tes upwardly biased as 
estimators of the costs that would be experienced if a system of 
tradable penµits were instituted. First, for source categories for 
which no control cost estimates could be found, emissions were assumed 
to be uncontrollable. Second, production and energy use at emitting 
facilities were assumed to be independent of the amount of control. In 
reality, firms with especially high emissions and stiff abatement costs 
are likely to reduce output or to make more efficient use of energy. 
Third, although several process changes are available to many firms, 
they are reluctant to reveal them because they are trade secrets that 
may confer significant competitive advantages upon these firms in a 
more stringent regulatory environment. No allowance for these process 
changes is made in the study, although an effort is now being made to 
model the possibility of changes in refinery product mix in the oil 
industry as one means of changing emissions from refineries and refined 
products. 
Because SO emissions in Los Angeles result largely from the x 
combustion of petroleum products, the availability of natural gas, 
which contains negligible amounts of sulfur, can significantly affect 
SO emissions. This, in turn, will affect the demand for permits and, x 
hence, their price. For this reason, three separate cases were 
analyzed: one which assumes a low level of natural gas availability; a 
second which corresponds to a historical supply year (1973) which 
59 
provides an intermediate supply assumption; and a third which assumes a 
high supply of natural gas. All three cases are based on emissions 
projections for the early 1980s with 1977 regulations assumed to be in 
place. In all cases, allocation priorities that are established by 
regulators, rather than the market, are assumed to determine access to 
the use of natural gas. This has an important effect on the results 
since regulatory allocation priorities are not related to the value of 
natural gas either in terms of its direct use or in terms of the 
effects of its use on air quality. 
With these caveats in mind, the cost data were used to estimate 
the demand for emissions permits and the distribution of permits that 
an efficient market would produce. The remainder of the paper will 
analyze the results of simulating the equilibrium of feasible permits 
markets. 
4.3 The Competitive Model 
In all of the models discussed, it is assumed that firms attempt 
to minimize the sum of abatement costs plus permit costs. In this 
section, a baseline competitive equilibrium distribution of permits is 
simulated. Firms are assumed to be price-takers, which is to say they 
assume that the equilibrium price of a permit is unaffected by their 
actions. A permit will be defined as the right to emit one ton so
2 
equivalent of sulfur oxides per day anywhere in the airshed. After 
examining the baseline case, the results will be compared to a fine-
tuned definition of permits that takes account of geographical 
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locations of sources and receptors, and to a simulated distribution of 
emissions when the permits are monopsonized. All calculations here are 
discussed in Hahn (1981), unless otherwise noted. 
To simulate the market, it is necessary to specify an air quality 
target. For the purposes of analysis, four possible emissions targets 
are examined which vary from no further net emission control down to 
about a 70 percent reduction in emissions, needed to meet the 
California sulfate standard. The four cases are summarized in 
Table 4.1. 
The calculations in Table 4.1 are based on a linear rollback 
model. The estimates of the emissions/air quality relationship would 
probably change if a more sophisticated air pollution model were 
employed, but the rollback model suffices for the purpose of showing 
how the permit price and abatement costs vary with the choice of an air 
quality target. Figure 4.1 illustrates the equilibrium price of a 
permit to emit one ton/day of SO in Los Angeles for the case in which x 
there is a low natural gas supply. All price and cost estimates are 
given in 1977 dollars. 
The decreasing step function in Figure 4.1 represents the derived 
demand curve for permits over the range of interest. The curve was 
drawn as a step function because most of the engineering cost estimates 
which were used to generate the demand curves were given in this form. 
The four vertical supply constraints in Figure 4.1 correspond to the 
four air quality targets presented in Table 4.1. The market price of a 
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TABLE 4.1 
Selected Air Quality Targets for the South Coast Air Basin 




1. Achieve California Sulfate Air Quality Standard 149 
of 25 micrograms/cubic meter over a 24 hour 
averaging time. 
2. Violate California Sulfate Air Quality Standard 238 
3-5% of the time. 
3. No additional controls with an above average 335 
natural gas supply. 
4. No additional controls with a low natural gas 421 
supply. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
The Demand for Permits with Low Availability of Natural Gas 
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permit is drawn next to each intersection. Thus, for the first case in 
which the California sulfate standard is met, the point estimate for 
the price of a permit is 4,590 dollars. From this graph, it is also 
possible to calculate two other potentially interesting numbers. The 
annual abatement cost for any level of air quality can be computed by 
integrating the area under the demand curve and to the right of the air 
quality target. The amount of money which could conceivably change 
hands in a permit market can be calculated by multiplying the number of 
permits issued by the equilibrium price. The significance of these 
numbers is discussed below. 
The price of an emissions permit is highly sensitive to the 
availability of natural gas and to the choice of an air quality target. 
A graphical illustration of this fact is shown in Figure 4.2, which 
illustrates the derived demand for permits under high and low natural 
gas availability. Note the wide disparity in price for any given 
emissions target. Table 4.2 relates the supply of natural gas to the 
equilibrium permit price for the four air quality targets specified 
previously. The table exhibits two interesting features. First, it 
can be seen that the price of a permit can vary by an order of 
magnitude depending on the assumptions concerning natural gas supply 
and the air quality target. Second, a comparison of the first two 
columns indicates that a fairly small change in air quality standards 
can cause a substantial change in the price of a permit. This reflects 
the fact that the marginal cost of sulfur oxides abatement changes 
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FIGURE 4.2 
The Demand for Permits with Low and High Natural Gas Availability 
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Table 4.2 
Price Sensitivity Analysis 
NATURAL AIR QUALITY TARGET 
GAS SUPPLY 
1 2 3 
Low 4,590a 2,720 2,000 
Historical 2,720 2,000 940 
High 1,320 650 470 
aAll prices in$ 1977. A permit entitles the user to emit 






The total annual cost of abatement varies considerably both as a 
function of the natural gas supply and the air quality target. The 
data are presented in Table 4.3. The estimates of abatement cost do 
not include the effect of abatement equipment installed in response to 
rules adopted prior to 1978. Consequently, the changes in abatement 
cost between different categories are probably the most meaningful 
figures. Even without estimates of some abatement equipment in place, 
. \ . . 
abatement costs are in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, 
except for the case in which natural gas is in plentiful supply. 
The most important point to be derived from Table 4.3 is that the 
availability of natural gas has a marked effect on the cost of reducing 
SO emissions. The only difference between the situations of low and x 
high natural gas supply is that the latter substitutes natural gas for 
100 millio~ barrels of residual and distillate fuel oil. Dividing the 
difference in abatement costs between the two cases by the difference 
in the amount of oil used yields an average cost saving per barrel-
equivalent of natural gas between 4 and 6 dollars, depending on the air 
quality target. The cost savings result from the substitution of 
natural gas for high-sulfur fuel oil, rather than using low-sulfur oil 
or extensive abatement investments to meet emissions targets. 
Another way of illustrating the critical importance of the 
natural gas supply is to ask what firms would be willing to pay for 
having natural gas substituted for one barrel of residual fuel oil. 
Assume that the marginal value of natural gas equals the full marginal 
cost of burning residual fuel oil. The full cost includes the price of 
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TABLE 4.3 










AIR QUALITY TARGET 
2 3 4 
576 487 447 
315 280 252 
83 66 53 
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a barrel of oil plus the cost of holding permits to emit the associated 
sulfur oxides. Performing the calculation for all twelve cases reveals 
that firms would be willing to pay anywhere from 107 percent to 130 
percent of the price of the residual fuel oil for a BTU equivalent 
amount of natural gas. 
The last key point which the analysis of the competitive case 
raises is the magnitude of the sums of money which could conceivably 
change hands if a market were to be implemented. Define the total 
annual value of the permits as the number issued multiplied by the 
annual price people are willing to pay to hold a permit for one year. 
(This price is obtained by multiplying the data in Table 4.2 by 365.) 
For the twelve cases examined here, the total annual value of the 
permits varies between 65 and 250 million dollars with an average of 
just under 150 million dollars. With approximately 10 million people 
in the Los Angeles area, this implies that each resident could receive 
15 dollars per year if the permits were auctioned and the proceeds were 
distributed to the public. Some critics have argued that the magnitude 
of the potential wealth transfers involved does not bode well for 
marketable permits in the political arena. While problems with 
distribution can be viewed as a barrier to implementation, there is an 
alternative view that control over the distribution of permits makes it 
that much more likely that a politically acceptable solution can be 
found. 
To justify tackling a difficult distributional issue, the 
expected cost savings from a marketable permit system must be 
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substantial. The estimation of these savings is the subject of the 
next two sections. First, the expected savings from maintaining the 
same level of emissions under a marketable permit system are estimated. 
Then, a system of undifferentiated emission permits (which takes no 
account of the location of each source) is compared with the case of 
fine-tuning on a geographic basis. 
4.4 Standards ~· Tradable Emissions Permits 
Many of the relative costs and benefits of different approaches 
to regulation are not easily quantified. For example, it is clear that 
the tradable emission permit system suggested here will tend to reduce 
existing barriers to entry that industry faces under the current 
emission standards approach; yet, placing a meaningful dollar estimate 
on the expected net benefits from such a change is difficult. It is 
also difficult to know to what extent the marketable permit system will 
induce process changes and innovations in abatement technology over 
time. Because of the problems in estimating dynamic efficiency gains, 
this section will focus on static efficiency gains which can accrue 
from using a market mechanism. For the specific case of controlling 
SO emissions in Los Angeles, the gains from using an incentive-based 
x 
approach to maintain the status quo can be expected to be relatively 
small in comparison to other applications which have been examined. 
This is because the local pollution control agency has attempted to use 
cost-effectiveness as a major criterion in promulgating rules. 
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The specific problem is to examine how the competitive 
equilibrium under a tradable emissions permit system compares with the 
current standards approach to regulation. The first step in the 
analysis is to project the level of expected emissions under standards. 
This calculation is performed for all three levels of natural gas 
supply, and two sets of standards. The first set of standards consists 
of those in place by the end of 1977. The second set consists of those 
expected to be in place by 1985. The projected emissions for the six 
cases are shown in Table 4.4. Note that the projected emissions for 
the low natural gas scenario under 1977 standards correspond to case 4 
in Table 4.1. The predicted emissions in 1985 are lower than 1977 
sulfur oxides emissions under standards because more stringent controls 
are placed on three source categories: petroleum coke calciners, fluid 
catalytic crackers and residual fuel burning by refiners. 
The next step in the analysis is to simulate the competitive 
equilibrium for an emissions permit market for the six cases shown in 
Table 4.4. The expected annual savings in moving from standards to 
tradable emissions permits are then computed. These are shown in 
Table 4.5. 
An inspection of Table 4.5 reveals that significant cost savings 
exist even in the case where a pollution control agency has 
specifically tried to implement cost-effective control strategies. 
Moreover, it is likely that such savings would increase as the 
constraint on permissible emissions were tightened. The savings would 
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TABLE 4.4 
Sulfur oxides Emissions Under Standards 
(Tons SOX/Day) 
NATURAL GAS STANDARDS 
1977 1985 
Low 421 364 
Historical 298 250 
High 211 167 
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TABLE 4.5 
Annual Cost Savings 
with an Undifferentiated Tradable Permit System 
(in millions of 1977 dollars) 
NATURAL GAS STANDARDS 
1977 1985 
Low 23 22 
Historical 17 15 
High 10 8 
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result, in part, from a lessening of the administrative burden of 
having to repeatedly search for cost-effective control strategies. It 
is also probable that political factors would be more likely to 
constrain the feasible set of individual source standards as abatement 
costs rise dramatically with the introduction of tighter standards. 
In addition to the magnitude of expected cost savings in moving 
to a tradable permits market, it is of some interest to consider their 
origin. For example, does a consistent pattern emerge as to which 
activities are "overregulated" relative to the cost minimum? An 
examination of all six cases reveals that the category of residual fuel 
burning for both refiners and utilities faces more stringent controls 
than would result if the cost minimum were achieved. This implies that 
under a tradable permit system residual fuel burners would tend to burn 
higher sulfur fuel than they are currently burning, while other sources 
would add control equipment to maintain current total emission levels. 
Finally, a word needs to be said on the general problem of 
comparing different regulatory systems on the basis of potential cost 
savings. The typical approach that is taken, and the one employed 
here, assumes that the cost estimates developed for a given study are, 
in some sense, the appropriate standard of comparison. Why this should 
be the case is usually unclear given the uncertainty surrounding the 
cost estimates. While it may be useful to employ cost data in 
estimating static efficiency gains, the potential pitfalls of this 
approach need to be clearly stated. 
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The preceding analysis deals with the case in which emissions 
permits are freely tradable throughout the airshed, with no account 
taken of the differences among sources in the impact of emissions on 
ambient air quality. In practice, a fine-tuned permits market would be 
difficult to implement; however, the outcome of such a system, assuming 
it could be implemented, can be simulated in the same fashion as the 
case of a competitive market for geographically unspecified permits. 
The results of these simulations are discussed in the next section. 
4.5 The Gains from Fine Tuning 
Instead of having a single market where permits are 
undifferentiated, imagine a case where there are several markets 
corresponding to each of the receptors within an air quality region. 
Assume further that firms would have to participate in all markets 
where their individual emissions affect air quality. This is the 
essence of the "fine-tuning" problem. In this section, the gains from 
moving to a finely-tuned permit system are examined. 
The benchmark for purposes of comparison is the undifferentiated 
permits market. This will be compared with a case in which there are 
17 markets corresponding to the 17 receptors illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
The calculation of annual abatement costs are presented in 
Table 4.6. All calculations are based on the low natural gas case. 
Column (1) lists six alternative levels of total emissions for the 
airshed. Column (2) lists the associated average air quality based on 
the cost-minimizing pattern of emissions which result from an 
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TABLE 4.6 
Annual Abatement Costs and Market Arrangements 
(costs in $ millions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BASELINE AVERAGE COSTS FOR COSTS FOR COSTS FOR 
EMISSIONS AIR SINGLE MAR.KET EQUIVALENT "ADJUSTED" 
TARGET QUALI'q IN EMISSIONS MULTIPLE MULTIPLE 
(TONS/DAY ( gm/m ) PERMITS AIR QUALITY AIR QUALITY 
so2 EQUIV) MARKETS MARKETS 
150 7.0 682 682 682 
200 7.8 614 606 594 
250 8.4 565 557 545 
300 8.9 515 513 505 
350 10.1 476 473 464 
400 11.1 455 448 436 
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undifferentiated permit market. Average air quality represents the 
arithmetic mean of annual sulfate concentrations at the 17 monitoring 
sites. Column (3) shows the abatement costs for achieving these levels 
assuming a competitive permits market. 
Associated with the competitive distribution of each of the 
emissions levels in column (1) is a set of annual concentrations of 
sulfates at each point in the region at which air quality is monitored. 
Suppose that instead of setting a limit on total emissions, regulators 
issue permits to pollute at each receptor point in an amount that would 
result in the competitive equilibrium in the emissions permit market. 
Each source of emissions would then need to acquire separately permits 
for the pollution its emissions caused at every monitoring station. 
Because the location of the emission sources matters in affecting 
measured air pollution, this approach could produce additional 
rearrangements of emissions ~ and some increase in total emissions 
that resulted in lower abatement costs but did not degrade air quality 
at any measuring station. Column (4) shows the costs associated with 
the competitive equilibrium distribution of emissions under this 
system. 
Finally, suppose regulators are concerned only with air quality 
at the worst measuring station, and that they create pollution permits 
for each station that allow pollution at every monitoring station to 
equal the pollution measured at the worst station under the competitive 
equilibrium distribution of emissions permits in column (1). This 
would allow further trades and increases in emissions as long as air 
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quality did not deteriorate at the location with the worst pollution, 
and did not force some other station to have its air quality 
deteriorate beyond the level at the worst-case station. The abatement 
costs associated with the competitive equilibrium distribution of these 
permits is shown in column (5). 
The result of these simulations is that defining permits in terms 
of ambient pollutant concentrations, and geographically differentiating 
the permits for each monitoring location, has relatively little effect 
on the efficiency of the market. The differences in annual abatement 
costs under the three systems vary from zero to four percent of the 
total, amounts that are surely small compared to the difficulties of 
trying to implement a more complicated system. 
The robustness of this result was checked by altering two sets of 
parameters in the simulation. First, because the abatement cost curve 
for residual fuel users plays a crucial role in determining price and 
total abatement cost, this marginal cost was increased and decreased by 
SO percent. The savings in abatement cost were quite similar to the 
results in Table 4.6. As a second check on robustness, source/receptor 
air quality relationships were altered to represent meteorological 
patterns observed in 1974 rather than the base case which was 
associated with 1973. Again, it was found that potential savings were 
quite small. 
There are two qualifications to the basic result that a finely-
tuned system may not be warranted on the basis of cost savings. First, 
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it should be noted that air quality is measured in terms of annual 
concentrations. If a shorter averaging time is used, the result may 
not obtain. Second, the result speaks to the present. These 
calculations are based upon the abatement possibilities and emissions 
inventories of existing firms in their current locations. Future 
economic change in the airshed conceivably could alter the pattern of 
emissions such that a more complicated system would provide substantial 
benefits. But at present, there does not appear to be a serious loss 
in efficiency associated with adopting the simplest approach of making 
SO emissions permits freely transferable throughout the Los Angeles x 
airshed. 
4.6 The Effects .Q!_ Market Power 
Thus far, the analysis has been restricted to the case in which 
firms act as price-takers in the permits market. One potential problem 
with a marketable permits system is that one or a few firms may be able 
to manipulate the market to their advantage and, in the extreme, 
destroy its efficiency advantages over standards. This problem cannot 
be dismissed lightly for the case at hand. 
Table 4.7 gives the estimated market share for the largest permit 
holder, which happens to be a utility. The market share of a firm is 
defined to be the percentage of the total number of permits that it 
holds. A casual inspection of the numbers reveals that under 
competition, the firm holding the largest market share will probably 
own somewhere between one-fourth to one-half of the permits. Whether 
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TABLE 4.7 






(Percent of Total Permits) 
AIR QUALITY TARGET 
1 2 3 4 
31 43 45 41 
32 43 48 48 
23 29 40 47 
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this will, in fact, allow this firm to dominate the market is an open 
question which is currently being investigated. For the present, it 
will be assumed that the sizable market share may allow this firm to 
exercise market power. 
The market power of the firm with the largest market share could 
manifest itself in several ways. It is not even clear without further 
specification of the conditions of the market whether a firm with 
market power will act as a monopolistic seller of permits or as a 
monopsonistic buyer. Here we will analyze a case that appears 
plausible in its initial conditions, yet extreme in the assumption 
about the strength of market power. We assume that the firm in 
question initially will be given fewer permits than it is expected to 
want to hold after the market in permits is opened. This is consistent 
with present policies that tend to force utilities to levels of 
abatement having higher marginal abatement cost than is common for most 
other industries. Thus, we assume that the utility will be the only 
purchaser of permits; that is, the initial distribution of licenses is 
such that the utility will be able to exercise maximal market power. 
In such a market, the equilibrium price will equal the marginal 
abatement cost of the sellers of permits, but not of the monopsonistic 
buyer. In purchasing permits, the monopsonist will take account of the 
fact that as it increases its purchases of permits, it will drive up 
their price. Hence, it will buy fewer permits at a lower price than 
would be the competitive, cost-minimizing solution. In other words, 
the monopsonist will abate too much in relation to other firms, and the 
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latter will have lower marginal abatement costs than the former. To 
the monopsonist, some additional, uneconomic abatement will be 
worthwhile because of its depressing effect on the price paid for the 
permits that it acquires from other firms. 
Table 4.8 shows the simulated market share of the firm holding 
the most permits, assuming that it achieves the profit maximizing 
monopsony equilibrium. A comparison of Tables 4.7 and 4.8 illustrates 
the additional abatement that the monopsonist will undertake if it has 
market power. The two tables also reveal one other interesting fact. 
The market share of the largest firm is highest at an intermediate 
natural gas supply and does not differ much between high and low gas 
supply. This reflects the fact that at the extremes natural gas is 
either used sparingly or extensively by almost all sources, while the 
intermediate case reflects the fact that utilities will be among the 
last to be allowed to switch to gas from low-sulfur fuel oil under the 
current scheme for gas allocations. 
The decrease in market share is typically accompanied by a 
decrease in the price of a permit. This can be seen by comparing 
Table 4.9 with Table 4.2. As in the competitive case, the permit price 
still varies over an order of magnitude, depending on the air quality 
target and the supply of natural gas. 
Although the differences between the competitive and 
monopsonistic case appear large, whether they cause a major loss of 
efficiency in achieving abatement targets remains an open question. 
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TABLE 4.8 






(Percent of Total Permits) 
AIR QUALITY TARGET 
1 2 3 
20 31 37 
32 40 33 












Permit Prices Under Market Power 
AIR QUALITY TARGET 
1 2 3 
2,000 1,000 
2,720 1,000 650 
1,000 470 420 
8 All prices are in$ 1977. A permit entitles the user to 







The appropriate measure of inefficiency is neither price nor market 
share, but the differences in total abatement costs under the two 
situations. If at the competitive equilibrium all firms face a fairly 
flat marginal abatement cost over a wide range of emissions reductions, 
a large shift of emissions from the monopsonist to the rest of the 
firms might entail relatively little loss of efficiency. As can be 
seen in Figure 4.1, all of the choices of alternative ambient air 
quality standards happen to fall within relatively flat portions of the 
demand curve for permits, and therefore in areas in which the abatement 
cost function obeys essentially constant marginal costs. Calculations 
of the efficiency loss of market power were made in each case, and the 
loss was determined to be relatively small, ranging from zero to ten 
percent depending upon the particular combination of assumptions about 
natural gas supplies, ambient air quality standards, and the method 
used for estimating the abatement cost functions. The estimated loss 
in efficiency due to market power is quite sensitive to small changes 
in the cost functions. Consequently, considerable thought must be 
given to the possibility of building in protections against 
monopsonistic market power into the tradable permits system. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This essay has focused on examining the results from feasible 
permits markets. The analysis of the competitive case for an emissions 
permit market demonstrated that the equilibrium price is very sensitive 
to the desired level of air quality. In addition, the effect of 
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changes in the supply of natural gas was shown to be considerable. The 
next issue which was raised was how the current standards regime 
compares with a permits market. It was found that the current 
standards may place excessive controls on residual fuel burners when 
compared with the competitive equilibrium solution. The final phase of 
the competitive analysis compared an emissions permit market with the 
case of fine-tuning. The payoff to fine-tuning was relatively small in 
the short run, when estimated using annual air quality data. The 
question of an appropriate averaging time for air quality data deserves 
further study, particularly because of its relationship to "hot-spots" 
--areas with abnormally high pollutant concentrations. 
The analysis of the competitive case was followed by an analysis 
of a case in which the largest firm could exercise monoposony power in 
the permits market. The effect of market power on efficiency was 
relatively small for the cases examined here. Nevertheless, care 
should be exercised in selecting particular trading institutions and 
initial allocations in this market. The potential for exercising 
market power is there, but can probably be addressed directly through a 
judicious selection of institutions, and a careful analysis of bow the 
initial distribution of permits could affect the long-term equilibrium 
price and distribution of permits. 
87 
Footnotes for Chapter 4 
* The work reported here was supported in part by the California Air 
Resources Board. There are three individuals who were instrumental 
, in developing the ideas contained in this paper. Roger Noll aided 
in the final phase of writing and analysis; Glen Cass developed the 
emissions/air quality data; and Richard Hanson provided data management 
support which made the calculations tractable. While I gratefully 
acknowledge this support, I must also claim responsibility for the 
views expressed herein, including any remaining errors. 
1. The Los Angeles region refers to the South Coast Air Basin and a 
part of Ventura County. The current definition of the South 
Coast Air Basin includes all of Orange County, the majority of 




A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND FOR EMISSION LICENSES* 
This paper examines the qualitative effects that a market in 
transferable licenses in emissions will have on a firm's input 
decisions and its expenditure on abatement equipment. The case of the 
competitive firm is examined in detail, and this is compared with a 
firm which can exert monopoly power in product and factor markets. 
The model employed here differs from previous work in that the price 
of the variable input is explicitly related to its quality. This can 
be compared with the more conventional approach which treats the 
pollutant as a factor of production. 1 Several authors have shown that 
the derived demand for inputs of fixed price and quality are downward 
1 . 2 s oping. In Section 1, this result is extended to the case where 
input quality can be varied. Section 2 compares the demand for 
licenses under competition with the demand for licenses when a firm 
can exert power over product or factor markets. In Section 3, the 
role of other traders and the authority issuing licenses is explicitly 
included in the analysis. Section 4 summarizes the results. 
5.1 The General Problem 
Attention is focused on the problem of controlling emissions 
associated with the use of productive inputs. When the relationship 
between emissions and ambient pollutant concentrations is linear, then 
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the subsequent analysis obtains for the control of secondary 
pollutants as well as the control of primary emissions. 
The control of sulfur oxides emissions is one example for 
which the model would be appropriate. Sulfur enters into the 
production process through the use of natural resources that contain 
it, usually coal and petroleum used as energy inputs. When these 
inputs are burned some of the sulfur contained in them is converted to 
so2 and so3 • For a given abatement technology, the relationship 
between sulfur entering the production process and resulting emissions 
of sulfur oxides is approximately linear. 
The firm may adopt two basic approaches to reducing emissions. 
It can either reduce emissions directly by purchasing equipment such 
as scrubbers and baghouses or it can reduce the level of pollutant 
entering into the production process. This latter reduction is 
normally accomplished by purchasing higher quality inputs, which 
typically cost more, by curtailing output, or by varying the amount of 
inputs used per unit of output in production. For simplicity, the 
last method for reducing emissions will be ignored. Suppose that the 
firm has a production function f(E), where E represents the level of 
inputs. The function f is assumed to be twice differentiable and 
strictly concave so that f' > 0 and f'' < 0. 
Let X(R,s,E) characterize the firm's abatement opportunities. 
X is the total annual emission rate; R is the total annual expenditure 
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on abatement; and s is the amount of the pollutant contained in a unit 
of the input stream, E. Emissions are assumed to decrease with 
greater abatement expenditures, but there are decreasing returns to 
such endeavors, (i.e., x1 < 0 and x11 > 0). On the other hand, annual 
emissions will increase if the firm chooses lower quality inputs or 
increases the level of its inputs (i.e., X2 > O and x3 > 0). 
Furthermore, it will be assumed that increasing inputs will not 
improve the marginal effect of a given pollutant content, and may make 
it worse (i.e., x
23 
L 0). 3 The firm's problem is to maximize profits, 
or the difference between total revenues and the sum of input costs, 
abatement costs and license costs. Formally, we have: 
where 
Maximize pf(E) - e(s)E - wX(R,s,E) - R 
R,s,E 
p = price of output, 
e(s) ~unit price of inputs; e' < 0 e'' > 0, and 
w = license price. 
(5.1) 
The price of inputs is presumed to be a convex function of the 
pollutant content. From this, it immediately follows that a firm 
would never wish to use two or more different quality inputs 
simultaneously, where such inputs are defined solely in terms of 
4 pollutant content. Empirically, this relationship has been shown to 
hold approximately for heavy fuel oil prices in Los Angeles. 5 
First-order conditions for an interior solution are given by: 
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-wX1 - 1 = 0 
-e'E - w~ = 0 





Equation (S.2) says that at tho margin, an additional dollar spent on 
abatement equipment will be exactly offset by tho savings resulting 
from decreased emissions. Equation (S.3) balances tho reduction in 
emissions from buying higher quality inputs against the increase in 
tho cost of buying licenses. Equation (S.4) equates tho marginal 
revenue product of using an additional unit of inputs with the 
increase in the cost of input, which consists of two components: tho 
direct cost of inputs, e, and the indirect cost due to having to 
purchase more licenses, wx
3
• 
The interesting comparative statics questions revolve around 
the etfoct of a change in the license price on abatement expenditures, 
the pollutant content of inputs, the level of inputs, and hence, the 
ultimate level of emissions which is chosen. Totally differentiating 
the first order conditions gives rise to the following Hessian 
matrix, C: 
c = -wx12 (-e"E-wX ) 22 
(-e' -wX ) 
23 (pf" -wx ) 33 
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Let C .. denote the ijth cofactor of C and [C] denote the determinant. 
1J 
Performing the comparative statics yields expressions for the effect 
of a change in license price on the endogenous variables: 
aR 1 




Assume that sufficiency conditions for an interior maximum are met. 6 
This implies that C is negative definite. Even with this assumption, 
aR as . oE aw' aw and aw cannot be signed unambiguously. However, it is possible 
to show that tho demand for licenses is downward sloping (i.e., 
:; < 0). Substituting equations (5.S) - (S.7) into (5.8) yields: 
(Xl,X2,X3) ell c21 c31 xl 
ax 
+ 1 c12 c22 c32 x2 aw TCT (S.9) 
cl3 c23 c33 X3 
Because C is negative definite, this implies c -1 is negative definite. 
Thus, equation (5.9) indicates that il < aw o. 
While the sign of the terms in equations (S.5) - (5.7) cannot 
be determined exactly, it is possible to infer from equation (5.9} 
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5.2 A Comparison of Competition with Market Power 
A simple case to analyze is where the pollutant in the inputs 
just equals emissions; that is, no abatement can be achieved through 
expenditure on equipment. In this case, reductions can be achieved by 
reducing the pollutant content of inputs and/or reducing the level of 
inputs. One example would be the containment of sulfur oxides through 
the purchase of lower sulfur fuels. Formally, the firm's problem may 
be written as follows: 
Maximize pf(E) - e(s)E - wsE 
s,E 
First-order conditions for an interior maximum are given by: 
-e'E - wE = 0 




Equation (5.11) indicates that s should be chosen so as to equate the 
cost of polluting more, w, with the marginal cost of buying higher 
quality inputs, -e'(s). Equation (S.12) balances the marginal revenue 
product with an increase in input costs. 







From the assumptions on e and f, B is negative definite. An 
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examination of the effects of a change in the price of a license on 




e"(s) < O 




Equation (5.14) says that the pollutant content decreases with an 
increase in the price of a license while (5.15) says that the level of 
inputs also declines. Since the overall level of emissions is given 
by sE, it is readily seen that emissions decrease in response to an 
increase in the price of a license. 
It is possible to compare the situation when the firm can 
exert market power with the competitive case by making suitable 
changes in (5.10) and carrying out the required optimization. Three 
cases will be considered: first, the case of pure monopoly; next, -the 
case when a firm exerts some influence over the energy market and 
finally, the case when a firm can dominate the license market. The 
monopolist's problem is the same as above, except now p = p(f(E)), 
which gives: 
Maximize p(f(E))f(E) - e(s)E - wsE 
s,E 
First-order conditions for an interior maximum are given by: 
-e'(s)E - wE = 0 





Equations (S.17) is identical with equation (S.11). From the 
assumptions one. the value for s which solves (S.17) (assuming one 
exists) will be unique. 7 Thus. the monopolist and perfect competitor 
will choose the same pollutant content. To determine who would 
pollute more, it is only necessary to consider whether the monopolist 
will use more or fewer inputs than in the competitive case. Assuming 
the revenue function for the monopolist is strictly convave and an 
interior solution to the problem exists. then the monopolist will use 
less energy and, hence, pollute less than his competitive counterpart. 
To see this, define the revenue function: R(E) = p(f(E))f(E). The 
usual differentiability assumptions imply R' > 0 and R'' < O. 
Comparing conditions (5.12) and (5.18), it is clear that setting Eat 
the optimal level in the competitive case will yield the following 
inequality: 
pf' + fp'f' < e(s) + ws, (S.19) 
since fp'f' < O. The question is whether (5.19) can be brought into 
equality by adjusting E. From (5.11) and (5.17), we saw that the 
pollutant content is identical for the two cases, independent of the 
level of inputs which is chosen. This means that the expression on 
the right-hand size of (S.19) can be treated as a constant. Noting 
that the left-hand side of (5.19) equals R'(E), it immediately follows 
that the only way to bring (S.19) back into equality is to decrease E 
from the competitive level. 
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So far, we have derived conditions under which the monopolist 
will emit less and produce less than in the perfectly competitive 
case. The key assumption concerned the shape of the revenue function. 
This assumption is also critical for deriving the comparative statics 




e"(s) < O (S.20) 
s 
R' ' (E) < O (S.21) 
A comparison of Equations (S.14) and (S.20) reveals that the effect of 
a change in license price on pollutant content will be the same for 
the monopolist and the competitive firm for a given level of input 
quality. The effect of a change in license price on input usage will, 
in general, differ, even for inputs of the same quality. However, the 
analysis reveals that the qualitative results under monopoly and 
competition are the same. Both pollutant content and input usage 
decline with an increase in the price of a license. 
The results for the case in which the firm faces an upward 
sloping supply curve for inputs closely parallel the monopoly case. 
The problem is the same as the competitive case except e is now a 
function of s and E. The firm tries to: 
Maximize pf (E) - e(s,E)E - wsE. 
s,E 
The price of inputs is assumed to increase as demand increases 
(5.22) 
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(e2 ) 0). In addition, it will be assumed that changing the pollutant 
content will have no influence on the relationship between input 
demand and price (e
12 
= 0). This latter assumption essentially allows 
the solution to the first-order conditions to proceed in two stages. 
First, the pollutant content is determined, and then the level of 
inputs is chosen. 
First order conditions for an interior maximum to (S.22) are 
given by: 
- e1E - wE = 0 (S.23) 
pf' - e - Ee2 - ws = O (5.24) 
Equation (5.23) determines the optimal pollutant content, s. If E is 
set to the optimal competitive level, this gives rise to the following 
inequality: 
pf' - Ee2 < e + ws (5.25) 
The problem is to adjust E so as to bring (5.24) into equality so that 
the first order conditions are satisfied. Assuming that the costs of 
inputs eE, is a convex function in E (for any given s) is sufficient 
-to insure that the optimal level of inputs will be less than the 
competitive case. 
The problem of assessing the behavior of a firm which can 
exert control over the market price for emissions licenses is similar 
to the previous case, but somewhat more complex. The general problem 
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is the same as in the competitive case except now license price is 
presumed to be negatively related to emissions so that w=w(sE) and 
w' > O. The conventional approach to such problems is to disregard 
output effects and solve the following cost minimization. 
Minimize C(s) = e(s)E + w(sE)sE, 
s 
(5.26) 
where the level of inputs is fixed at E. There are two basic reasons 
for ignoring output effects: first, because the comparative statics 
results are ambiguous when these effects are included, and secondly, 
because output effects may not be very important in the short-run. 
Dividing (5.26) by E and solving the equivalent minimization 
problem yields the following first order condition: 
e'(s) + w + sEw' = 0 (5.27) 
Equation (5.27) balances the marginal cost of buying more licenses, 
w + sEw', with the cost of buying lower sulfur fuel. If the cost 
/ 
function, C(s), is convex so that C''(s) l O, then the optimal 
pollutant content chosen will be less than in the competitive case, 
provided the output produced is the same. The argument parallels the 
case of monopoly and will not be repeated here. Instead, we turn to 
an alternative formulation of the market power problem which 
explicitly considers the role of other agents. 
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5.3 Market Power: A More General Approach 
The subsequent analysis considers the case where one agent 
exercises market power, while all other agents assume they cannot 
affect the price of a license or the quantity of licenses issued, L, 
(i.e., a Stackelberg ''leader and follower'' model). The aggregate 
reported demand curve for all agents excluding i is denoted by Q-i(w); 
-i it is assumed that Q is twice continuously differentiable and 
-i' downward sloping, i.e., Q < O. Let Q(w) represent the aggregation 
-i of i's true demand for licenses, Qi(w), with Q (w), which i takes as 
given. The quantity of licenses supplied by the ''center'' is given 
by C(w) which is presumed to be twice continuously differentiable and 
strictly increasing, i.e., C' > O. The curves are illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Agent i is aware that he may choose any point on the center's 
supply curve above the price of w , which represents the equilibrium 
0 
price if i submits no demand. A price of w
1
, assumed to be greater 
than w
0
, would result if i submitted his true demand. 
To derive i's best approach to the problem, first note that 
his effective supply, denoted as S(w) is given by: 
S(w) = C(w) - Q-i(w) for w > w 
- 0 
(5.28) 
-i' Because C' > 0 and Q < 0, S'(w) > 0, which means that agent i's 









Figure 5.1. The General Supply and Demand Problem. 
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Define the inverse of S(w) as s(L). Since Sis upward sloping, so is 
its inverse, i.e., 
w = s(L) s' > 0 
Finally, define agent i's inverse demand function as d.(L); this 
1 
(5.29) 
function is presumed to be strictly decreasing, i.e., di' < O. Agent 
i's problem is depicted in Figure 2. 
L1 represents the quantity of licenses agent i receives if he 
reveals his true demand and the market clears at w1 • 
The question which i must address is whether it is in his 
interest to misstate his true demand, and if so, in which direction. 
To answer this question i's interest is defined as follows: 
Agent i's net gain= ~di(q)dq - s(L)L 
0 
(5.30) 
Equation (5.3) says that the gain i derives by purchasing L licenses 
is given by the difference between the area under his inverse demand 
curve between 0 and L and the costs of purchasing L licenses. With 
this measure of welfare, it is apparent that agent i will never demand 
more than L
1 
licenses since he not only has to pay more for all 
inframarginal units, but he also loses on the marginal units as well. 
The only other possibility is that agent i demands fewer than L
1 
licenses. Suppose that he chooses a level of licenses equal to L
2 
as 
illustrated in Figure 2. To compare this outcome to the situation in 








Figure 5.2. Agent i's Problem. 
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and losses in a systematic manner. The gains to i which result from 
I 
being charged a price w2 instead of w1 are noted by the shaded area B. 




) fewer licenses are 
represented by area A. If (B - A) is positive, then we may conclude 




) exceeds that associated with 
revealing his truthful demand, (L1 ,w1). The problem of showing that 
it is always in i's interest to overabate is equivalent to showing 
that there exists an Ls(O,L
1
) for which (B - A) is positive. 
Maximizing (5.30) with respect to Land assuming an interior 
maximum exists yields the following first order condition: 
d1(L}(s(L} + Ls'(L}) = 0 (5.31} 
Noting s'(L} > 0 implies: 
(5.32) 
To bring (5.32) back into equality requires that the L selected be 
less than L1 • This shows that it is in agent i's interest to 
underrepresent his demand for pollution emission provided that there 
is no subsequent trading of licenses, agent i knows the demand curve 
of all other agents and the supply curve of the center, and the second 
order conditions are satisfied. It is of some importance to know what 
conditions on the demand or supply curve would guarantee that the 




d.(L) - 2s'(L) - Ls''(L) < 0 
1 
(5.33) 
From (5.33), we see that it is sufficient to presume that the rate of 
change of the slope of the effective supply curve, s''(L), is 
nonnegative. 8 
The problem analyzed above parallels the case of pure 
monoposony very closely. The only difference is that agent i is not 
the only buyer, and hence, must consider how the demand of others will 
affect his supply. The qualitative results which emerge in the two 
problems are the same, namely that output and price are both below the 
level they would have reached in the presence of competition. 
The extreme cases were not considered in the analysis. If 
agent i's effective supply curve does not vary with price, then he 
will demand L
1 
licenses since, by assumption, he cannot exert any 
downward pressure on the price of a license. In this case i would 
perceive the license market in the same light as an emissions tax. 
Another case not considered is when the center fixes the · supply of 
licenses so that C'(w) = O. In this case, the result still obtains 
that the firms with market power will overabate. 
The principal result is called into question, however, when 
any ''real world'' considerations are brought to bear on the problem. 
For example, an incomplete knowledge of others' demand curves and the 
center's supply curve would mean that agent i would have to guess at 
the equilibrium price in his absence. Of course, knowing the 
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equilibrium price is not enough. Agent i cannot construct his 
effective supply curve without knowing the center's supply and others' 
demands over a fairly wide range. The addition of secondary markets 
further complicates the issue. The clearing price expected in the 
secondary markets is likely to vary across agents and will affect each 
individual's behavior in the initial auction. Without explicit 
modeling of such problems, it is a little premature to conclude that 
market power will result in overabatement. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The analysis focused on the derived demand for tradable 
licenses. In the general case it was found that introducing inputs of 
different quality did not change the basic result that the derived 
demand was downward sloping. This holds both for the monopolist and 
the competitive firm. A comparison of three cases of market power in 
a more restricted setting revealed that in all three cases, firms 
would tend to overabate in comparison to the competitive firm. A more 
general analysis of the case when a firm can dominate the license 
market indicated that the assumptions required to obtain the 
overabatement result may be too restrictive. This is one area which 
merits further thought if marketable permits are to become a reality. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 5 
* The work reported here was supported in part by the California 
Air Resources Board. I wish to thank Roger Noll and James Quirk 
for providing helpful comments. All views and conclusions 
expressed herein are my responsibility. 
1. For example, see Baumol and Oates (1975), p. 3Sff. 
2. For examples, see Samuelson (1974), pp. 76-78, Russell (1964) and 
Winch (1965). 
3. This assumption can be explained in terms of the desulfurization 
of fuel oil. Suppose the effect of desulfurization is to remove 
a constant fraction (1 - 1) of total potential emissions, sE. 
Total expenditure on abat~ment is constant by assumption. The 
problem is to consider how~! changes as inputs increase. 
Consider a discrete change 1n inputs from E to (E + AE). Before 
AX 1 AX 1 the change, As= ;AsE. After the change As - ;As(E + AE). In 
the limit, it is apparent that x
23
10. 
4. The proof is straightforward. Suppose the firm wishes to use two 




). Let A 
equal the fraction spent on the first type and (1-A) be the 





)1 > e(As + (1-A)s
2
). Thus, using 
inputs of the same quality with the equivalent pollutant content 
would be cheaper. If the firm wishes to purchase n different 
quality inputs, where n is arbitrary, the same line of reasoning 
holds. 
The proof assumes, of course, that any convex combination 
of pollutant contents are available for values of A on the unit 
interval. In the case of sulfur in fuel oil, this is a 
reasonable approximation. 
S. On this point, see Chapter 3 of ''Implementing Tradable Emission 
Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles Air Shed,'' written 
by William Rogerson. 
6. For the problem to make sense, R, s, and E must be nonnegative. 
These constraints are assumed to be ineffective. 
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7. For example, if lim e'(s) =+a> and lim e'(s) = O (i.e., e is a 
s~o s~ 
''neoclassical'' function), then for any w > O, (5.17) has a 
unique positive solution in s. 
8. In the economics literature the abatement cost function for all 
firms is typically presumed to be twice differentiable and 
strictly convex. Accepting this assumption would mean that a 
sufficient condition for a global maximum on (O,L
1
) would be that 
C''(w) 10. For a specific example, see Ackerman, p. 279. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MARKET POWER AND TRANSFERABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The idea of using the market to ration a desired quantity of 
inputs among producers and consumers is by no means novel. Working 
examples include markets for taxi medallions and liquor licenses. 
Suggested applications for this construct abound in the economics 
literature, especially in the fields of air and water pollution. 1 Why 
has the idea of setting up a market in transferable property rights 
received so much attention? One key reason, and the reason which 
motivates this paper, is that such markets have the potential to 
achieve a given objective in a cost-effective manner. Whether this 
potential is realized depends, among other things, on the design of the 
market and the extent to which individual firms can exert a significant 
influence on the market. 
The purpose of this paper will be to analyze the problem of 
"market power" in a rigorous framework. Section 2 develops the basic 
model for the case in which one firm can influence the market. Section 
3 extends the analysis to the case of two firms with market power. In 
Section 4, the results of the theoretical analysis are compared with 
the conventional wisdom and directions for future research are 
discussed. 
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6.2 The Basic Model 
A critical assumption underlying the competitive model is that 
firms act as if they were price takers. In the model developed below, 
it will be assumed that all firms except one are price takers. The 
basic question to be answered is how (and whether) the equilibrium 
price and quantities will vary as a function of the initial 
distribution of permits among firms. 
Consider the case of m firms with firm 1 designated as the firm 
with market power. A total of L permits are distributed to the firms, 
with the ith firm receiving Qi permits. Firms are allowed to trade 
permits in a market which lasts for one period. The number of permits 
which the ith firm has after trading will be denoted by Q •• All firms 
i 
except the market power firm are assumed to have downward sloping 
inverse demand functions for permits of the form P.(Q.) over the region 
1 i 
[0,L]. P. represents firm i's willingness to pay. All trades in the 
i 
market are constrained to take place at a single equilibrium price, P. 
For concreteness, we shall consider the case of a classical pollution 
externality. All price-taking firms attempt to minimize the sum of 
abatement costs and permit costs. For the case of pollution, the 
assumption of downward sloping demand curves is equivalent to the 
assumption that marginal abatement costs are increasing. 




< 0 and 






C.(Q.) + P(Q.- Q~) 
i i i i 
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(i=2, ••• ,m). 
The first order condition for an interior solution is: 




This merely says that price takers will adjust the quantity used, Q., 
i 
until the marginal abatement cost equals the equilibrium price, P. 2 
Equation (6.2) implicitly defines a demand function Q.(p) which is 
i 
downward sloping on [O,L] for i=2, ••• ,m. Furthermore, note that the 
number of permits the ith price-taking firm will use is independent of 
its initial allocation of permits. 
The analysis of the firm with market power is less 
straightforward. Begin by defining an abatement cost function c1CQ1) 
where Cl < 0 and C!' > O. This says that the firm with market power 
faces increasing marginal abatement costs. Firm 1 has the power to 
pick a price which will minimize its expenditure on abatement costs and 
permits subject to the constraint that the market clears. Formally, 
the problem is to: 
Minimize c1CQ1) + P(Q1- Q~) p 
m 
Subject to: Q1 = L - !: Q·(P). . 2 i i= 
(6.3) 
Direct substitution of the constraint into the objective function gives 







(L - E Q.(P)) + P(L - ~ Q.(P) - Q
1
). 
i=2 l. i=2 l. 
(6 .4) 
The first-order condition for an interior minimum is given by the 
following equation: 
m m 
(-C' - P) ~ Q~ + (L -.~ Ql..(P) - Q01) = O. 1 i=2 l. i=2 
(6.5) 
Equation (6.5) reveals that the only case in which the marginal cost of 
abatement, -Cl, will equal the equilibrium price is when firm l's 
distribution of permits just equals the amount it chooses to use. In 
effect, this says that the only way to achieve a cost-effective 
solution, where marginal abatement costs are equal for all firms, is to 
pick an initial distribution of permits for firm 1 which coincides with 
the cost-minimizing solution. 
This gives rise to the following result: 
Proposition 1: Suppose there is one firm with market power. 
If it does not receive an amount of permits 
equal to the number which it elects to use, 
then the total expenditure on abatement will 
exceed the cost-minimizing solution. 
The key point to be gleaned from the analysis is that the distribution 
of permits matters, with regard not only to equity considerations but 
also to cost. Traditional models of such markets view problems of 
permit distribution as being strictly an equity issue.3 With the 
introduction of market power, it was shown that the distribution of 
permits may also impinge on efficiency considerations. 
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The next logical question to explore is how the market 
equilibrium will vary as a function of firm l's initial distribution of 
permits. Doing the necessary comparative statics yields: 
= (6.6) 
L=constant 
The expression for the denominator is the second order condition for 
the cost minimization and will be positive if the second-order 
sufficiency condition for a minimum obtains. For example, in the case 
of linear demand curves (i.e., Q~' = 0), the expression will be 
:L 
positive. Thus, for the case when a regular interior minimum exists, a 
transfer of permits from any of the price takers to the firm with 
market power will result in an increase in the equilibrium price. An 
innnediate corollary to this result is that the number of permits that 
the firm with market power uses will increase as its initial allocation 
of permits is increased. Formally, the problem is to show 
= (aQ1 \ (..l!:..) . 
ap j aqo 
1 
(6. 7) 









The expression on the right-hand side of (6.8) equals - ~ Q.(P), which 
i=2 l. 
is positive, because demand curves are presumed to be negatively 
sloped. 
One question which arises in this model is whether there is 'any 
systematic relationship between the distribution of permits to the firm 
with market power and the degree of inefficiency. If inefficiency is 
measured by the extent to which abatement costs exceed the minimum 
required to reach a stated target, then it is possible to show the 
following result: 
Proposition 2: * Let QJ denote the distribution of permits 
for tfie case when permit distribution equals 
pe~it use for the firm with market power. 
Then inefficiency*increases both as Q~ 
increasis above Q1 and as Q~ decreases 
below Q1 • 
The proposition is verified by determining how total cost, TC, varies 
as a function of Q~. 
The efficient solution is derived from the following 
minimization: 
m 
Minimize TC = Cl(Ql) + ~ c. (Q.,..) 
I Ql' • o o '~ i=2 
l. 1. (6.9) 
m 
Subject to: Ql + ~ Q = L. i=2 i 
First order conditions imply: 
' -c . ( Q • ) = p . ( Q • ) = p • 
]. ]. ]. J. 
(i=2, ••• ,m) (6.10) 
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Equation (6.12) is obtained by differentiating (6.10) with respect to 







ap m (-P - C ) ap 
~ 
1 = - --
" 
- =--
3QO i=2 c. dQO 
1 1. 1 
(6.13) implies: 







1 (P + c
1
) ~ " i=2 c 
i 
(6.13) 
> (<) o. 
(6.14) 
Combining (6.14) with equation (6.5) yields the result that total cost 
* achieves a minimum at Q
1 
and will increase as the permit distribution 
* deviates from Q1 in either direction. 
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In addition to determining how inefficiency varies with the 
initial distribution of permits, it is also of some interest to know 
when the level of inefficiency can be related to observable variables 
such as the quantity of permits which are exchanged. Placing 
restrictions on the demand for permits by price takers yields the 
following result: 
Proposition 3: The degree of inefficiency will increase as 
the amount the firm with market power decides 
to buy or sell increases, provided the demand 
for permits by price takers is linear. 
To see this result, first note that any price not equal to the 
competitive equilibrium price will cause efficiency losses. Second, 
note that as the deviation between the competitive equilibrium and the 
observed price increases, the degree of inefficiency increases. This 
result follows immediately from the assumption that all firms face 
increasing marginal abatement costs. It remains to be shown that 
trading increases as the size of the deviation between the actual price 
and the competitive equilibrium price increases. 
The size of the deviation between the actual price and the 
competitive price is governed by the initial distribution of permits to 
the firm with market power, Q~. The amount of net buying, (Q1- Ql), is 
also governed by Qr· At the competitive equilibrium, the firm with 
market power does not trade -- Q1= Q~· If it can be shown that an 
increase in Q~ leads to an increase in the price of a permit and a 
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decrease in net buying, then Proposition 2 will have been verified. 
Formally, the problem is to show ap/aQ~ > 0 and a(Q1- Q~)/aQl < O. 
The assumption of linear demand implies Q~' = 0 for all price 
l. 
takers. Inspection of equation (6.6) reveals ap/aQ~ > 0 for this case. 
The relationship of net buying by the firm with market power to its 





= - 1 < o. 
m 2 " m 
L; Qi Ci - 2 ~ Q. 
i=2 i=2 i 
(6.15) 
The second equality is based on substitution of equations (6.6) through 
(6.8). Based on the signs of Qi and Ci', it follows that aQ1/aQ~ < 1 
for this case, which immediately yields the desired result. 4 
Other analysts have considered the possibility of market power, 
but generally restrict themselves to a special case. For example, 
Ackerman et al. (1974) consider the problem for a specific hypothetical 
case, but do not deal explicitly with the effect of permit 
distribution.S DeLucia (1974) considers a numerical example in a 
simulation of a water rights market in which the rights are auctioned. 
The firm with market power plays the role of a monopsonist, restricting 
its demand for permits in an effort to keep the permit price low. The 
situation analyzed by DeLucia corresponds to the case when the firm 
with market power receives no permits initially. 
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While concern that a firm or group of firms can influence such a 
market has been expressed, relatively little thought appears to have 
been given to exactly what is meant by market power and how to devise 
institutions which would yield a desirable set of outcomes. The simple 
model developed above indicates that market power is related not only 
to concepts of stock, but also to those of flow. The analysis reveals 
two essential points. Just because a firm is a large polluter, this 
does not necessarily mean it can exercise market power in the permit 
market. Secondly, if a firm does have market power in the permit 
market, its effect on price (assuming there is one firm with market 
power) varies with its excess demand for permits. That is to say, once 
the potential for market power has been ascertained, it is a flow 
net excess demand of the firm with market power -- which determines the 
equilibrium. 
The importance of the flow has immediate implications for market 
design. In.particular, with full knowledge of demand functions, a 
central authority could effectively pick the quantity of permits it 
wanted the market power firm to use through a suitable initial 
allocation. The limits to the discretion of the authority would be 
dictated by two extreme cases: pure monopsony in which all permits are 
distributed to the price takers, and pure monopoly in which all permits 
are distributed to the firm with market power. 
With only one firm having market power, the analysis is fairly 
straightforward. The existence of two or more such firms with power 
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complicates matters. The next section extends the basic result to deal 
with the case of duopoly. 
6.3 Duopoly and Market Power 
Notation will be carried over from the basic model developed in 
the previous section. In this case, two firms will be allowed to 
exercise market power. Let C2(Q2) be firm 2's cost function, assumed 
to have the same qualitative property as firm l's (Cz < 0 and c2' > 0). 
Define Q2 as the quantity of permits firm 1 thinks firm 2 will use and 
Q1 as the quantity of permits firm 2 thinks firm 1 will use. Firm 1 
and firm 2 face the following minimization problems: 
Firm l's Problem: 
m 
Subject to: L = Q1 + Q2 + ~ q.(P). . 3 i i= 
Firm 2's Problem: 
m 
Subject to: L = Q1 + Q2 + ~ Q·(P). . 3 i 1= 
(6.16) 
(6.17) 
Because the two problems are the same conceptually, attention will be 
focused on the solution to firm l's problem. The constraint in (6.16), 
which says that all licenses be used, implicitly defines the permit 
price, P, as a function of (Q1 + Q2). Formally, define P = P(Q1 ,Q2); 
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note that (ap/aQ1) = (ap/aQ2) > O over [O,L]. Substitution into (6.16) 
yields an equivalent problem for firm 1: 
(6.18) 
The first order condition for an interior solution is: 
o ap Cl + P + (Q1- Q1) aq- = 0. (6.19) 1 
This implicitly defines a reaction function Q1 = f(Q2). Note that, as 
in the simple market power case, the marginal cost of abatement will 
equal the equilibrium price if and only if the initial distribution to 
firm 1 is the optimum choice for Q1 at an equilibrium. Similarly, the 
first order condition for firm 2 is: 
(6.20) 
This implicitly defines a reaction function Q2 = g(Q1). 
The concept of an equilibrium needs to be defined. The concept 
used here is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Firm 1 minimizes its costs 
for any given level of Q2 and firm 2 minimizes its costs for any given 
* * * level of Q
1
• A pair (Q
1
,Q2) is defined to be an equilibrium if Q1 = 
* * * f(Q2) and Q2 = g(Q1). 
Equations (6.19) and (6.20) reveal that marginal abatement costs 
will be equal across firms if and only if Q1= Q~ and Q2= Q~. Thus, a 
similar efficiency result arises for the duopoly case -- namely: 
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Proposition 4: Suppose there are two firms with market power. 
If both firms do not receive an amount of 
permits equal to the number each elects to use, 
then the total expenditure on abatement will 
exceed the cost-minimizing solution. 
The critical question to be examined is how the equilibrium or 
equilibria will vary as the distribution of permits varies. 6 There are 
two approaches to this problem. One is to consider each reaction 
function separately and examine its attributes. A second is to 
consider comparative statics around an equilibrium when both first 
order conditions are satisfied. These will be considered in turn. 







aP o a2P 
) -<aq
2 
+ (Q1 - Q1) 
aq1aQ2 
" ap o a2P 






c1+2 -aQ + (Q -Qo) -
1 1 1 dQ2 
1 
Equation (6.21) gives the slope of firm l's reaction function. 
(6.21) 
(6.22) 
Equation (6.22) considers how the reaction function will shift with a 
change in the initial distribution of permits. For the general case, 
the signs of aQ1/aQ2 and aQ1 /aQ~ are ambiguous. The analysis is the 
same, mutatis mutandis, for firm 2's reaction function. Rather than 
impose restrictions on the individual reaction functions, it will be 
more useful to examine the equilibrium comparative statics. The cases 
examined below will reveal how the individual reaction functions can be 
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analyzed if the objective is to define conditions under which they will 
exhibit certain properties. 
Total differentiation of the first order conditions for the two 







The effect of a change in permits on usage cannot be predicted without 
further assumptions. Let D denote the (2x2) matrix on the left hand 
side of (6.23). The determinant of D will be positive if (a 2P/aQi) 
If IDI > 0 and the second order 
sufficiency conditions for a minimum to (6.19) and (6.20) are satisfied 
this implies D-l will have the following sign pattern: 
(+) ? 
sgn n-1 = (6.24) 
? (+) 
This, in turn implies that (aQ1 /aQ~) and (aQ2/aQ~) are positive. This 
is the analogue of the result obtained earlier with the basic model. 
The firms with market power will increase their use of permits as 
permits are redistributed from the price takers to the market power 
firms. 
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Further insight can be gained into the duopoly problem by 
examining three cases. First, consider the case when the aggregate 
demand by price takers is linear. This implies P(Q1 ,Q2) =A+ B(Qi+Q2) 
where both A and B are positive. Substitution into (6.19) gives the 
following expression: 
B l [dQll [ BdQ~ l 2B dQz = BdQ~ C'' + 2 
For this case, it is readily seen that IDI > 0. The comparative 




1 Qo = 
(:~!) 2 







2 Q0 = constant 
1 
1 " = TDf (C2 + 2B)B > 0 
= ,~, [(C~ + 2B)B - B2) > 0 





Equation (6.26) states that a transfer of permits from the price takers 
to firm 1 will result in an increase in the number of permits firm 1 
holds after trading. Transfering a permit from firm 2 to firm 1 has 
the same qualitative effect; however, as can be seen from a comparison 
of equations (6.26) and (6.27), the effect is smaller in absolute 
value. Equation (6.28) says that transfer of a permit from the price 
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takers to firm 2 will result in a decrease in the number of permits 
firm 1 uses. The same results hold, mutatis mutandis, for firm 2. 
This example also permits analysis of how the equilibrium price 
will vary under different distribution schemes. For example, suppose 
firm 1 is given all L permits. Now, consider the following two 
distribution patterns: 
1. Firm l's initial distribution decreases and firm 2's 
distribution increases commensurately; 
2. Firm l's initial distribution decreases by, say, x and 
firm 2's increases by ax (0 <a~ 1), with the remainder being 
distributed to the price taker. 
The qualitative implications for the two cases are illustrated in 
Figure 6.1. All that can be said is that the price trajectory for the 
second case will be below that of the first case because the total 
permits used by firms 1 and 2 will be less in case 2 for any given 
value of Ql not equal to L. The actual shape of the curves in the 
figure would be dictated by the derivatives of the marginal cost 
functions for the two firms. 
If the price-taking firms are initially vested with all the 
permits, then the question arises as to how price will vary as permits 
are transferred to firm 1 and/or firm 2. For example, if x permits are 
transferred from the price takers to the market power firms, is the 
equilibrium price of permits affected by the division of permits 
between the two firms? The answer is that the price will be affected, 
but without further assumptions on the third derivative of the cost 







Fifil1 1' s ALLOCATION (Q~) 
Figure 6.1 · 
Comparing Distribution Patterns 
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that in distributing permits from the price takers to the two firms 
with market power, the equilibrium price will increase because the two 
firms will elect to use more permits. 
Two other cases can be analyzed which yield similar qualitative 
results to those obtained in the linear case. The first of these cases 
corresponds to the case where firms 1 and 2 are not buyers, and the 
aggregate demand by price takers is concave to the origin. The second 
of these cases considers the opposite situation when firms 1 and 2 are 
not sellers, and the aggregate demand curve by price takers is convex 
to the origin. The results are summarized in Table 6.1. They are 
verified in the appendix to this chapter. 
The signs of the partial derivatives are given in the six cells 
of the table. They agree with equations (6.26) through (6.28). In 
addition, it can be shown for these two cases that the effect of 
transferring a permit from firm 2 to firm 1 is smaller in absolute 
value than the effect of transferring a permit from the price takers to 
firm 1. 
The purpose of this analysis of a Cournot duopoly model is to see 
how the results of the basic model might change with the introduction 
of more than one firm with market power. While the analysis tends to 
support the view that permit use will increase with the initial 
allocation to the duopolists, how the equilibrium price will vary with 
different patterns of distribution is generally ambiguous without 











Sunnnary of Two Special Cases of Duopoly 
MARKET POWER 
FIRMS NOT BUYERS 
AND aZ~ < 0 
aq1 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( - ) 
MARKET POWER 
FIRMS NOT SELLERS 
AND a2p > 0 
aqf 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( - ) 
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results arise when the aggregate demand by price takers is linear or 
both firms with market power are on the same side of the market. 
The question might arise as to what happens in the case of two 
firms with market power on different sides of the market. In this 
situation, models of bilateral monopoly may be more appropriate than 
duopoly models. For example, suppose the two firms attempt to jointly 
minimize the product of their objective functions as suggested by the 
Nash bargaining problem.7 Formally, this yields: 
Minimize 
Ql,Q2 




The first order conditions to this problem reveal that if Q1= Q~ 
0 and Q2= Q2, then the solution to this problem will be efficient; 
however, for the case when the two firms are on different sides of the 
market, the comparative statics remain ambiguous because of the rather 
complex nature of the first order conditions. This leaves the question 
of bilateral monopoly unresolved, which is perhaps as it should be 
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given the inherent difficulties in arriving at credible behavioral 
assumptions for this case. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The formal analysis in the previous two sections indicates the 
range of potential outcomes that might arise when firms can exert 
rather specific types of influence in markets which ration a fixed 
supply of intermediate or final goods. There are clearly other 
strategies which large firms might pursue, particularly when the market 
is just getting under way. For example, it is quite likely that the 
total number of permits issued and the pattern of distribution could be 
affected by the behavior of such firms. In the case of pollution 
rights, some firms might refuse to play the game if they do not care 
for the new set of rules. Such actions are difficult to model 
explicitly, which is why the focus here has been on the potential for 
gain within a well-defined set of rules. Even within this setting, 
further research is warranted. 
One avenue for further research would be to extend the basic 
model to consider other forms of duopoly and oligopoly behavior. 
Another potentially fruitful area of investigation is to test the 
theory of the basic model in a small-group experimental setting and 
determine when, and under what types of institutions, it is supported. 
Finally, the magnitude of the result could be examined using data from 
a proposed market in property rights. 
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The key result obtained here, that it is the net excess demand 
that ultimately determines the extent of a firm's market power, does 
not appear to be widely recognized. One 'reason is that many people 
feel that market power in such markets will not be a problem. For 
example, Teitenberg (1980), in surveying the literature on air rights 
markets, expresses the view that "the anti-competitive effects of a TDP 
[transferable discharge permit] system are not likely to be very 
important in general. 118 For several applications such as the one 
considered by DeLucia (1974) and the one considered by Hahn (1981), the 
assumption that the market will approximate the competitive solution 
would appear to depend critically on how the institutions are designed. 
Because there is a very real possibility that several markets in 
transferable property rights could be subject to different kinds of 
systematic manipulation, there is a need to further explore the 
ramifications of such problems in theory and applications. 
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APPEND IX TO CHAPTER 6 
This appendix derives the results contained in Table 6.1. 
Assuming D has an inverse, equation (6.15) can be rewritten as: 
(6.32) 
ap ap a2P a2P a 2P a2P 
Note that <3Ql = <3Qz and aqZ = aqlaQZ <3Qz<3Ql = aqZ . This is because 
1 2 
the equilibrium price is a function of the sum of the permits used 
by the two firms with market power. 
There are two cases to consider: 
Case 1: 
Equation (6.32) yields the following results: 
> 0 (6.33) 
(:~!) = a3; 1 (c~ + a3; 2l 
1 dQO = -dQO 
2 1 IDI 
> 0 (6.34) 
< 0 (6. 35) 
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A comparison of equations (6.34) and (6.35) reveals that: 
(6. 36) 





0 0 Case 
3Q2 
Ql .::. Ql Q2 .::. Q2 . 
1 




Footnotes for Chapter 6 
* I would like to thank Jim Quirk, Ed Green, Roger Noll and Jennifer 
Reinganum for providing useful input to this effort. Any remaining 
errors are solely the responsibility of the author. 
1. Teitenberg (1980) provides a comprehensive survey of the 
application of marketable permits to the control of stationary 
source air pollution. A general list of references to potential 
applications in air and water pollution is provided in the study by 
Anderson et al. (1979). 
2. The assumption of increasing marginal abatement costs implies that 
the firm attains a regular minimum in solving the problem (6.1). 
3. The analysis by Montgomery (1972) is one such example. In this 
analysis, firms are assumed to be price takers. For the case of 
one pollutant, one market and a linear relationship between source 
emissions and environmental quality, Montgomery finds that the 
distribution of permits will have no effect on achieving the target 
in a cost-effective manner. 
4. Proposition 2 will also hold if (Ql-Ql) ~(,S) 0 and Q("' ~(.S) O. 
5. See Ackerman et al. (1974), p. 279. 
6. An equilibrium will exist if the reaction functions are continuous 
on [O,L]; however, the possibility of multiple equilibria cannot be 
ruled out. 
7. See Luce and Raiffa (1957), pp. 124-128. 
8. Teitenberg (1980), p. 414. 
9. The comparative statics results derived here obtain globally 
because all principal minors of the matrix D are positive on 




ON RECONCILING CONFLICTING GOALS: 
* APPLICATIONS OF MULTIOBJECTIVE PROGRAMMING 
7.1 Introduction 
Decision makers typically have several objectives in mind when 
choosing among different policy alternatives. While these objectives 
are sometimes associated with target values, it is frequently the case 
that the objectives are viewed as choice variables which are to be 
jointly maximized in some manner. There are two basic approaches to 
such problems. Treating the objectives as targets permits the decision 
maker to minimize costs over a feasible region. If, instead, the 
objectives are viewed as control variables, then an alternative 
approach is to maximize some function of the objectives subject to a 
set of feasibility constraints which usually includes a limitation on 
expenditures. This latter approach falls under the general heading of 
multiobjective programming. 
While the two approaches to the problem can yield the same 
solution, this need not be true, especially for cases in which the 
tactics available for meeting the proposed objectives have an adverse 
impact on some subset of those objectives. An example would be the 
problem of increasing automobile fuel efficiency while decreasing 
emissions. Several control tactics aimed at reducing emissions can 
have an adverse impact on fuel economy. This problem is complicated 
further by the introduction of safety considerations. Lave (1980) 
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analyzes the explicit tradeoff s that result from existing legislation 
in this area, and provides a cogent analysis of the difficulties 
inherent in reconciling the objectives of improved safety, better fuel 
economy and reduced emissions. His conclusion that secondary impacts 
of automobile regulation may be quite important indicates that this may 
be a potentially fruitful application for multiobjective programming 
techniques. The particular problem raised by Lave will be illustrated 
in greater detail in the conclusion, after the approaches for meeting 
objectives are analyzed more formally. 
The objective of this paper is to compare the two approaches for 
achieving policy objectives. For illustrative purposes, the problem of 
meeting environmental objectives is examined in detail. The relative 
merits of the two approaches for decision making are addressed in the 
conclusions. 
7.2 Application 1Q.. Environmental Problems 
The traditional approach to the problem of finding cost-
ef f ective solutions to environmental problems has been to specify an 
emissions target and then compute the minimum cost associated with 
meeting the objective. The choice of an emissions target is usually 
predicated on some hypothesized relationship between emissions and 
environmental quality. When the relationship between emissions and air 
quality is linear, as is assumed in the models developed by Kohn (1971) 
and Atkinson and Lewis (1974), then the general problem of meeting an 
environmental quality objective can be solved directly through the use 
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of linear programming. A non-linear relationship between emissions and 
air quality may mean that the only part of the problem amenable to 
solution by linear programming is the relationship between control 
costs and emissions. Such is the case, for example, 
in the analysis of the Los Angeles smog problem undertaken by 
Trijonis (1974). 
This analysis specifically focuses on the relationship between 
costs and emissions. As an alternative to minimizing costs subject to 
achieving a prescribed reduction in emissions, an approach which treats 
emissions as the choice variable and cost as a parameter is examined. 
The analysis reveals two essential points: first, that the alternative 
approach yields a straightforward method for generating isocost curves 
and second, that an optimal solution to the traditional cost-minimizing 
formulation need not coincide with a point on an isocost curve. 
7.3 The Traditional Approach 
The problem of selecting a set of control tactics which minimize 
the cost of meeting a given emissions target is set forth in the 
following linear program which was applied by Trijonis (1974): 
137 







Subject to: Bx = E 
Ax .:5. s 







is the (r x 1) vector of activity levels for the r control 
methods, 
is a (1 x r) vector of control costs, 
is an (n x r) matrix whose element b .. represents the 
reduction of pollutant i resulting ffdm one unit of control 
activity j, 
is the (n x 1) vector indicating the required reduction in 
emissions, 
A is an (s x r) matrix whose element a .. represents the 
number of units of source i controll~d by one unit of 
control activity j, 
S is the (s x 1) vector of source magnitudes, 
D is a (p x r) matrix whose element d .. represents the amount 
of limited supply input i used by ok~ unit of control 
activity j, 
L is the (p x 1) vector specifying the magnitudes of the 
limited supply inputs. 
The CMl approach minimizes control costs subject to a set of 
constraints. Equation (7.la) states that the vector of emissions be 
reduced by E units. The second set of constraints (7.lb) places 
limitations on the level at which different sources can be controlled. 
The third set of constraints (7.lc) places limits on the use of certain 
138 
fixed inputs in control activities, while (7.ld) states that all 
control activities be set at some nonnegative level. 
7.4 The Multiobiective Formulation 
An alternative approach to identifying cost-effective control 
strategies is to consider the problem of maximizing the reduction in 
emissions subject to capacity constraints, supply constraints and a 
budget constraint. Formally the problem can be stated as follows: 
The Multiobjective Approach (MO) 
Maximize Bx 
x 









where c is a scalar which fixes the annual expenditure 
on pollution control at some prescribed value. 
The constraints in the CMl formulation are similar to those contained 
in the multiobjective formulation; however, there are two important 
differences. A budget constraint (7.2a) is added and the constraint on 
emissions reductions is dropped.1 
As stated, the MO problem needs some further clarification, 
since the concept of maximizing a vector may not be clear. The vector 
xis defined to be an efficient solution to (7.2) if and only if the 
following two conditions hold: 
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1. x must be feasible, i.e., it must satisfy the constraint 
set, and 
2. there does not exist a feasible solution, x' such that 
Bx' 2, Bx and Bx' f Bx. 
While the solution of the MO formulation may appear, at first glance, 
to present a difficult problem, the formulation can be simplified 
considerably by applying the following lemma which allows the problem 
to be converted to a linear program. 
Lemma 1: The vector x* is an efficient solution of 
the MO problem if and only if there is a (1 x n) 
vector q > 0 for which x*2o~timizes the following linear program: ' 
The Corresponding Multiobjective Linear Program (MOLP) 
Maximize qBx 
x 
Subject to: (7.2a)-(7.2d). 
(7.2') 
Lemma 1 makes it possible to generate isocost curves (or at least very 
good approximations thereto) by carefully selecting several values for 
q and solving the MOLP problem. 
7.5 The Relationship Between the Two Approaches 
Comparing the CM! linear programming formulation with the MOLP, 
one might think that the two are equivalent in some sense, since the 
former minimizes costs subject to a given level of emissions reductions 
while the latter takes expenditures as given and maximizes a linear 
combination of emissions reductions. Surprisingly, the relationship 
between the two approaches is not obvious. The following two examples 
will serve to highlight the differences between the two problems. In 
Example 1, we consider a case where the solution to (7.1) does not 
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exist, but a solution to (7.2') exists for any given level of 
expenditures. 
Example 1: Suppose there is one control strategy x
1 
with 
c1 = $1, b11 E 1 and b 21 = 1, with 
the constraint set only requiring that x1 be 
nonnegative. A graph of this strategy is shown 
in Figure 7 .1. 
Let the objective for reducing emissions be given by point B with 
coordinates (4,2). The 45° line represents the control strategy x1 • 
Note that as you move down the line towards the origin, the level of 





) also equals 4. Reducing both types of emissions by one 
unit each so that (E1 ,E2) = (1,1) implies x1 = 1 and the cost is $1.00. 
Using the original CM! formulation, the prescribed goal of (4,2) is 
infeasible. This suggests an extension of the CMl formulation which 
would permit reductions greater than or equal to the stated targets. 4 





2 3 4 
FIGURE 7 .1 
Illustration of Feasible Emissions Reductions 
and Associated Costs 
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A Revised Cost Minimizing Approach (CM2) 
Minimize ex 
x 
Subject to: Bx LE 
Ax~ s 
Dx ~ L 
XLO 






consists of point A in Figure 7.1. If C • 4, then point A would also 
be optimal in terms of the MO formulation. 
Example 1 illustrates a case where no feasible solution exists 
to the original CMl problem and the solution to the CM2 and MO problems 
are identical. Next, we consider a problem which has an infinite 
number of solutions for the CM2 program, only one of which is optimal 
for the multiobjective program. 
Example 2: Suppose there are two control strategies x1 
and x2 with the following data: 
c = 3 1 
E = 12 1 
b22 - 1 
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The problem is to reduce each type of emissions by at least 12 




be chosen. Since there is only one feasible solution to the original 
CMl formulation, it must be optimal. The solution is (x1 ,x2) = (3,3), 
which results in a cost C = $12c00. Setting C = C, and considering the 
multiobjective program, it is easily seen that sole use of the control 
activity x2 will result in a higher value for E2, leaving E1 unchanged, 
thus showing the solution to the CMl problem is not optimal 
for the multiobjective problem. The problem is illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
The feasible region in Figure 7.2 corresponds to the revised 
cost minimizing problem. For the original cost minimizing problem, the 
feasible region reduces to the point K with (x1 , x2
) ~ (3,3). There is 
an infinite number of solutions to the revised cost minimizing problem 
characterized by segment JK ; however, of these solutions, only point J 
is optimal for the multiobjective problem when C • 12. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the CMl 
formulation can generate points which are inefficient in the sense that 
lower emissions may be attainable at the same cost. The CM2 program 
poses similar problems; however, because the CM2 approach covers a 
larger feasible region, we are assured that if the solution set to the 
CM2 formulation is not empty, it contains at least one point which will 
be an· optimal solution to the multiobjective program. 5 
While a solution to the original or revised cost minimizing 






5 10 15 
-X1 
FIGURE 7.2 
A Graphical Conparison of Approaches for Finding 
Efficient Environmental Controls , 
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possible to develop a sufficient condition under which a solution for 
the cost minimizing formulations will also solve the multiobjective 
program. 
In order to economize on notation, the source and supply 
constraints are merged. Without loss of generality, let 
Fx ~ P (7 .4) 
represent constraints {7.2b) and {7.2c) or (7.3b) and (7.3c). 
Because the theory of duality plays a central role in subsequent 
results, it will be useful to consider the dual formulations of the 
revised cost minimizing and the multiobjective linear programming 
problems. The dual to the CM2 problem is: 
' Maximize 
1 2 y ,y 
Subject to: .s. c 
y ~ o. 
The solution to the problem is given by the dual row vector 




The dual to the MOLP problem is constructed in a similar manner, 
yielding the following expression: 








In this case, the solution to the problem is given by the dual vector z 
= [zl,z2]. 
Two theorems will be developed. The first provides a basis for 
checking whether a solution to the cost minimizing problem is 
necessarily a solution to the multiobjective formulation. The second 
theorem turns the question around, identifying when a solution to the 
multiobjective problem will necessarily be optimal for the cost 
minimizing approach. 
Theorem 1: Suppose CM2 has an optimal solution x* with an 
Proof: 
associated dual solution y*. Consider the MO prob-
lem with C = ex*. Then x* is efficient for the MO 
l* problem if y > O. 
Suppose that x* is not efficient. Then there 
exists an x such that Bx~ Bx* and Bx ~ Bx*. 
This implies: 
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1* 2*1 ex~ [y ,y [;] x 
1* 2* = y Bx + y Fx 
l* 2* > y Bx* + y Fx 
• ex*. 
The first inequality is obtained from (7.Sa) by postmultiplying 
by x. This expression is simplified in the next step. The strict 
inequality is based on the supposition. Expressions (7.3a) and (7.4) 
are used in the subsequent inequality. Finally, the equilibrium 
theorem of linear programming is applied to obtain the desired result. 
Two comments are in order. First, note that the proof also 
works for the CMl formulation (i.e., with Bx= E). Second, note that 
the result has a straightforward intepretation when the dual variables 
are viewed as shadow prices. In short, the theorem says that as long 
as it costs more to get a reduction in all types of emissions (at the 
optimum) the cost minimizing solution will be efficient. 
The next problem is to identify when an efficient solution will 
be cost minimizing. This problem is resolved in the following theorem: 
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Theorem 2: Let x* be an efficient solution to the MO problem 
Proof: 
and set Bx* = E. Then, x* is optimal for the CM2 
problem if z1* > O. 
By contradiction: suppose there exists an x such that 
ex< ex* which also satisfies (7.3a)-(7.3d). Then, 
l* 2* 
-q Bx ?,. [ z , z ] [-~] x 
l* 2* -z c x + z Fx 
l* 2* > -z ex* + z Fx 
=- -qBx*. 
The first inequality is obtained from (7.6a) by postmultiplying 
by x. Simplifying the expression and applying the supposition yields 
the strict inequality. This is followed by a substitution using 
expressions (7.2a) and (7.4). Applying the equilibrium theorem of 
linear programming yields the desired result. 
This result holds for the original cost minimizing problem 
as well. It shows that an efficient solution to the MO problem will 
be optimal for CM! and CM2 provided that, at the margin, an extra 
dollar will increase qBx. This in turn, implies that at at least one 
type of emissions can be further reduced at the optimum. Note also 
l* that z > 0 implies that the budget constraint is effective at the 
optimum, i.e., ex* = C. 
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It is not obvious that the above results will always obtain. In 
particular, there are several pollution control activities which lead 
to decreases in one type of emissions at the expense of increasing 
other types. A case in point were the automobile exhaust emission 
controls for reactive hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide introduced in 
California in 1966 and in the remainder of the country in 1968. 
Unfortunately, the technological modifications adopted by American car 
manufacturers produced higher engine combustion temperatures which in 
turn dramatically increased the emissions of another pollutant~nitric 
oxide. While this problem has been corrected, it highlights the need 
to understand the likely impact of any new control technique when 
formulating the mathematical programming problem. 
Fortunately, it is a simple matter to check whether, in fact, the 
above relationships do obtain by generating the appropriate dual 
variables. Of course, since the conditions are sufficient and not 
necessary, if they are not satisfied, one may have to resort to a 
direct computational method by substituting the proposed solution into 
the problem and checking to see if it works. This can be done in 
moving from the MO to the CM formulation, but I am not aware of any 
simple way to move in the reverse direction if the assumptions of 
Theorem 1 do not hold. 
7.6 Conclusions 
The analysis in the foregoing paper focuses on the problem of 
achieving a cost-effective solution to the problem of reducing 
150 
emissions. The formal comparison of the multiobjective and cost-
minimizing approaches has served to illustrate that the traditional 
cost minimizing solution generated by a linear program will not 
necessarily be efficient. That is to say, it may be possible to 
achieve greater emissions reductions than specified in the cost-
minimizing formulation at the same cost. The multiobjective approach 
solves this problem by directly minimizing emissions subject to a 
budget constraint. 
One potential application where the multiobjective approach may 
yield different solutions than the cost minimizing approach can be 
illustrated for the case of automobile regulation, which was introduced 
in Section 7.1. Figure 7.3 provides a stylized representation of the 
tradeoffs among air quality, fuel economy and safety. There are two 
control activities, x
1 
and x2 • The first activity corresponds to an 
inspection and maintenance program aimed at improving the safety and 
reducing emissions of vehicles currently in use. The second activity 
corresponds to installing improved bumpers on new and/or used cars. 
The effects of these two activities on the objectives can be seen by 
noting that the line segments in Figure 7.3 represent constant levels 
of safety, air quality and fuel economy for the fleet as a whole. The 
direction of improvement is given by the vector perpendicular to each 
of the segments. Thus, for example, safety can be improved by 
increasing x1 and/or x2• 
Suppose this problem were cast in terms of a cost minimization 






INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE 
FIGURE 7.3 
Illustration of the Tradeof fs among 
Safety, Fuel Economy and Air Quality 
c 
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exceeding the constant levels of safety, fuel economy and air quality 
shown in the diagram. The feasible region would then correspond to 
triangle ABC. Now, suppose further that the isocost curves were 
parallel to segment AB , which means that the set of cost minimizing 
solutions corresponds to the segment. It should be clear that any 
point on the segment other than B is dominated in the sense that better 
fuel economy and improved air quality can be achieved at the same cost 
without sacrificing safety considerations. Unfortunately, there is no 
guarantee that the program will yield point B as the solution. This 
potential pitfall can be overcome simply by reformulating the problem 
as a multiobjective program. 
Given the potential for differences between the solution sets to 
the two approaches, the question naturally arises as to which approach 
would be more useful to the policy maker. The answer is that it 
depends. If the policy maker has already decided on target levels for 
the objectives, then the cost minimizing approach is tailor made for 
this problem. If, on the other hand, the policy maker is less certain 
of the overall objectives, then the multiobjective programming approach 
would probably be more appropriate since it is designed to identify the 
range of options available at a given level of expenditures. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 1 
* This paper has benefited from discussions with Joel Franklin, 
Gregory McRae, and James Quirk. The views expressed herein, 
including any remaining errors, are solely the responsibility 
of the author. 
1. This formulation does not explicitly preclude the possibility of 
a new level of emissions with some negative components. This 
situation can be handled by identifying a baseline level of 
emissions, say E0 , and then constraining E0 -E to be nonnegative. 
Introduction of this constraint does not substantively affect the 
analysis and is rarely, if ever, binding in actual applications. 
2. An asterisk will be used to denote an optimal solution to a given 
program. q > 0 implies each element of q is positive. 
3. A proof of this lemma for the case of equality constraints is presented 
in Franklin (1980). The extension to inequality constraints follows 
immediately upon introducing slack variables. 
4. This is the basic approach taken by Kohn (1971). 
S. The proof is straightforward. Let x* be a solution to the CM2 
formulation, and define c=cx*. This implies x* is feasible 
for the MO problem. If x* is optimal for the MO problem we are 
done. Suppose x* is not optimal. Then there exists a solution 
x' such that Bx'~ Bx* and Bx' ; Bx*. But, by construction 
x' would also be a solution to CM2. 
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CHAPTER 8 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The analysis presented in the preceding chapters points to 
several avenues for further research. Rather than review all the 
earlier suggestions, this section will present a few of the more 
important research areas that can be expected to provide further 
insights into the immediate problem. These areas are selected because 
they should be of general interest to researchers and environmental 
policy makers. 
The first area which needs to be explored further is the 
potential for exploiting the relationship between emissions and air 
quality. One question which might be examined is whether there are 
significant savings in overall abatement costs to defining permits 
seasonally. A second important topic for further study is to consider 
the possibility that some areas will experience abnormally high 
pollutant levels under an incentive-based system. As a first step, the 
idea of a "hot-spot" needs to be defined more carefully. Then, if the 
problem is expected to arise, thought must be given to building 
safeguards into the system. For example, it might make sense to place 
restrictions on where and when large fuel burners with more than one 
plant are permitted to burn certain types of fuel. A third topic in 
this area, about which little has been written, is the effect of 
uncertainty in linking emissions to air quality. A reasonable starting 
point here would be to estimate how the expected savings from 
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fine-tuning the definition of a permit are related to meteorological 
conditions. 
A second area of research relates to the problem of 
demonstrating, in some sense, that the system under study dominates the 
status quo. This is frequently difficult to do using "hard" data 
because several of the potential gains and losses are difficult to 
quantify. The traditional approach has been to estimate the static 
efficiency gains on the basis of available abatement cost data. 
Applying this approach in Chapter 4 gave rise to potential savings in 
abatement costs on the order of 10 million dollars annually. This 
issue is currently being explored along slightly different lines. We 
are attempting to introduce the possibility of refinery process changes 
into the model and estimate how this will affect abatement costs and 
the equilibrium price and distribution of permits. 
A final area of interest that is a key concern in implementing a 
market is the issue of institutional design. Major design criteria for 
a tradable permits market would include: equity in the initial 
distribution of permits; sufficient early transactions to produce a 
price for permits that is close to the long-run equilibrium; and 
attainment of an equilibrium price and distribution of permits that is 
close enough to the competitive case to assure attainment of air 
quality objectives at close to minimum costs. 
Two methods for initially distributing the permits appear to have 
the strongest equity claims. One would base permit distribution on 
156 
emissions as they existed prior to the attempt to control them, with 
perhaps some additional provision for firms that have entered the 
airshed or expanded capacity since that time. The other would base the 
distribution of permits on the projected equilibrium distribution that 
would result from a competitive market in permits. Any other method 
that is based upon historical emissions performance raises the 
objection that people who were early to comply with regulations would 
be punished for cooperating. Any method that is not based on emissions 
raises the objection that it is arbitrary, and, in any case, is more 
vulnerable to becoming bogged down in a contest between competing 
claims for redistributing wealth that have nothing to do with air 
pollution policy. 
Basing the initial distribution on the projected competitive 
equilibrium has a serious defect in terms of efficiency of the permits 
market. · To the extent that the initial distribution succeeded in 
finding the competitive equilibrium, it would also succeed in avoiding 
the necessity for any transactions among present sources. Only in the 
case of new sources or expansions of existing facilities would a demand 
for trades arise. Thus, a relatively speedy attainment of a stable, 
· competitive price for permits would not be likely under this mechanism. 
Indeed, much the same problems as confront the current banking and 
offset policies could be expected: a slow development of the market 
owing to the difficulties of finding trading partners and negotiating a 
price. 
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The other seemingly most attractive alternative on equity grounds 
is to base initial allocations on pre-regulatory emissions. 
Unfortunately, this raises two problems: one of data availability, and 
a second related to the possibility that the largest firm might exert 
market power. 
The dilemma in organizing the permits market under study here is 
that there is a seeming inconsistency in getting the single largest 
source of emissions to engage in transactions so as to get the market 
started quickly on a course that provides stable price signals to firms 
making abatement and location decisions, and in preventing the market 
from becoming monopolized. While we have not resolved the problem, 
several approaches are currently being investigated. 
One approach is to have different methods for the largest 
emissions source and other sources in terms of the initial distribution 
of permits, allocating to the potential monopsonist something like the 
competitive equilibrium estim.ate while using the historical basis for 
allocating permits to others. This would probably produce a situation 
in which the largest source was not a participant in the early stages 
of the market; however the remaining sources would have an incentive to 
engage in trades, and would be more likely to produce a competitive 
outcome. 
A second approach is to make a distinction between the most 
important sources as a group and the remaining sources, allocating 
permits initially so that all of the former are equally interested in 
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acquiring more permits, while all of the latter want to sell. Thus, 
each of the half-dozen most important sources of emissions could be 
allocated a number of emissions permits that falls short of the 
competitive equilibrium by the same absolute amount, while the other 
firms could be given permits that exceeded the estimated equilibrium by 
some proportion that is consistent with the first allocation. In such 
a situation, the largest source of emissions would hold the largest 
number of permits, but would not account for an especially large 
fraction of the transactions on its side of the market. 
Another approach is to allocate only some fraction of the permits 
on the basis of historical or projected emissions, and let the state 
auction the rest. All firms could, say, be allocated 80 or 90 percent 
of their projected equilibrium emissions, and the remaining permits 
would be sold. This has the objection that, like an emissions tax, the 
state ends up collecting revenues, so that the costs of the system 
exceed abatement costs; however if the fraction of permits sold were 
small enough, the efficiency gains to industry in rationalizing 
abatement control strategies would offset the revenues lost to the 
auction. By placing all firms on the same side of the market (buyers), 
and by the appropriate choice of an auction institution, the largest 
firm, even with a market share of forty percent, is not likely to be 
able to be effective in exercising market power. 
The value of investigating these organizational issues goes 
beyond our particular concern about market power in the context of the 
case study that we are currently undertaking. While potential 
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monopolization of permits may not be a common problem, all potential 
applications of tradable permits involve the selection of an 
institution for allocating the permits in a manner that satisfies 
equity constraints and still promotes an efficient market. Whereas we 
expect that the nature of the problems to be overcome in facing a 
trade-off between these objectives will differ from case to case, we 
anticipate that conflicts between efficiency and the political 
perception of equity will be common. The substantial differences in 
regulatory standards among industries and between new and old sources 
is a manifestation of the same kinds of conflicts in the current 
system. Thus, specification of the properties of different methods for 
distributing permits and organizing trades is an important general 




The principal findings of this thesis fall into three general 
areas: the first related to empirical findings; the second related to 
market power and efficiency; and the third related to the current 
understanding of market mechanisms and their applicability to pollution 
problems. 
The key empirical results from the market simulation are 
discussed in Chapter 4. The effects of changes in the natural gas 
supply were quantified. Not surprisingly, it was found that this 
strategy for reducing sulfur oxides emissions would be quite 
attractive, even at natural gas prices significantly above those 
observed in intrastate markets. A second result was that current 
standards may place excessive controls on residual fuel burners when 
compared with the competitive equilibrium solution. A third result, 
and perhaps the most interesting, that emerged from the market 
simulation data was the estimate of the gains from fine-tuning. The 
payoff to having several different markets corresponding to distinct 
receptor points was found to be relatively small in the short run. 
In addition to the empirical results, there is one theoretical 
result which deserves mention. The result emerges from the analysis 
of market power. Simply stated, it says that the distribution of 
permits is not only a question of equity, but can also affect whether 
the competitive equilibrium is achieved. Hopefully, this result will 
be examined in an experimental setting in the near future. 
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A final point which needs to be addressed relates to the 
applicability of market mechanisms to environmental problems. Given a 
physical and chemical understanding of the environment, this project 
has attempted to integrate legal, political and economic concerns in an 
effort to consider the feasibility of different alternatives for 
controlling pollution problems. Once these alternatives are evaluated, 
the next logical step is to develop a pilot experiment aimed at 
bringing some of the more attractive policy alternatives to fruition. 
It is in this area that the greatest challenges are likely to arise. 
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